University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
CUREJ - College Undergraduate Research
Electronic Journal

College of Arts and Sciences

3-30-2022

Reform in Name Only: The Difficulties of Dismantling Mass
Supervision in Pennsylvania
Srinidhi Ramakrishna
University of Pennsylvania, sramak@sas.upenn.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/curej
Part of the American Politics Commons, Civic and Community Engagement Commons, Criminology
and Criminal Justice Commons, Inequality and Stratification Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Law
and Society Commons, Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons, Politics and Social Change
Commons, Public Policy Commons, Social Control, Law, Crime, and Deviance Commons, Social Policy
Commons, and the Sociology of Culture Commons

Recommended Citation
Ramakrishna, Srinidhi, "Reform in Name Only: The Difficulties of Dismantling Mass Supervision
in Pennsylvania" 30 March 2022. CUREJ: College Undergraduate Research Electronic Journal,
University of Pennsylvania, https://repository.upenn.edu/curej/266.

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/curej/266
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Reform in Name Only: The Difficulties of Dismantling Mass Supervision in
Pennsylvania
Abstract
Pennsylvania has one of the highest rates of people on probation in the United States. Probation reform
legislation has repeatedly emerged in the Pennsylvania legislature since controversy arose in 2017 over
rapper Meek Mill’s long probation sentence. However, probation reform initiatives that would reduce the
use of probation in Pennsylvania have been obstructed or amended to actually increase its use and
severity. To understand what makes achieving such probation reform difficult, this thesis analyzes three
significant roadblocks – the phenomenon of devolution and the actions of two advocacy groups. This
thesis is grounded in ten interviews conducted with key actors whose work intersects with the
Pennsylvania probation system. These interviews are analyzed alongside scholarly literature, reports from
advocacy organizations, and news and legislative materials. The analysis finds that firstly, the
consequences of devolution encourage funding probation departments, create entrenched stakeholders,
and impede anti-carceral activist efforts. Secondly, the REFORM Alliance, a national advocacy
organization particularly active in Pennsylvania, is complicit in punitive changes to the bills it endorses,
excludes community organizers, and maintains a neoliberal alliance with the carceral state under the
guise of reform. Thirdly, the Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association greatly shapes probation reform
measures to be more punitive, benefiting from a political landscape in favor of tough-on-crime district
attorneys despite some prosecutorial fragmentation. By identifying key institutional barriers, this thesis
aims to assist efforts to end mass supervision in Pennsylvania.
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Abstract
Pennsylvania has one of the highest rates of people on probation in the United States. Probation
reform legislation has repeatedly emerged in the Pennsylvania legislature since controversy arose
in 2017 over rapper Meek Mill’s long probation sentence. However, probation reform initiatives
that would reduce the use of probation in Pennsylvania have been obstructed or amended to
actually increase its use and severity. To understand what makes achieving such probation reform
difficult, this thesis analyzes three significant roadblocks – the phenomenon of devolution and
the actions of two advocacy groups. This thesis is grounded in ten interviews conducted with key
actors whose work intersects with the Pennsylvania probation system. These interviews are
analyzed alongside scholarly literature, reports from advocacy organizations, and news and
legislative materials. The analysis finds that firstly, the consequences of devolution encourage
funding probation departments, create entrenched stakeholders, and impede anti-carceral activist
efforts. Secondly, the REFORM Alliance, a national advocacy organization particularly active in
Pennsylvania, is complicit in punitive changes to the bills it endorses, excludes community
organizers, and maintains a neoliberal alliance with the carceral state under the guise of reform.
Thirdly, the Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association greatly shapes probation reform
measures to be more punitive, benefiting from a political landscape in favor of tough-on-crime
district attorneys despite some prosecutorial fragmentation. By identifying key institutional
barriers, this thesis aims to assist efforts to end mass supervision in Pennsylvania.

4
Introduction
Current trends in criminal legal reform are unstable. On one hand, condemnation of the
United States’ correctional system has grown increasingly common over the last two decades.
Faced with the world’s highest incarceration rate, phrases like “mass incarceration” and
“criminal justice reform” have become political buzzwords utilized by Democrat and
Republicans alike. The American public has also been clamoring for reform. A meta-analysis of
public opinion results between 2014 and 2016 conducted by the Opportunity Agenda found that
Americans are growing less punitive and more supportive of rehabilitative measures.1
Additionally, national polling conducted by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and
Benenson Strategy Group in 2017 found that 91% of Americans thought that the criminal justice
system needed to be fixed.2 Protests in the summer and fall of 2020 following heightened public
awareness of recent police murders led some analysts to characterize Black Lives Matter as the
largest movement in US history.3 Widespread public outcry decrying police violence, demanding
prison and police reform, and exploring alternative possibilities of decarceration and abolition
have hinted that the country is a unique moment in which dismantling the carceral state is, for
once, possible.
Despite this time’s seemingly historic nature, the number of changes shrinking the
carceral state have been limited. In the summer of 2020, many anti-carceral activist groups called
for a fundamental reimagining of public safety, such as reductions in the incarcerated population,
police defunding, and significant investments in social and economic infrastructure.4 However,
1

“A New Sensibility: An Analysis of Public Opinion Research on Attitudes Towards Crime and Criminal Justice Policy” (The Opportunity
Agenda, 2016).
2
“91 Percent of Americans Support Criminal Justice Reform, ACLU Polling Finds,” American Civil Liberties Union (November 16, 2017),
accessed December 14, 2021, https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/91-percent-americans-support-criminal-justice-reform-aclu-polling-finds.
3
Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui, and Jugal K. Patel, “Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest Movement in U.S. History,” The New York Times,
July 3, 2020, accessed December 14, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/202Use Today's
Date0/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html.
4
The Washington Post Editorial Board, “Reimagine Safety,” The Washington Post, March 16, 2021, accessed December 14, 2021,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/interactive/2021/reimagine-safety/.
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actions undertaken in response resulted in little more than symbolic reforms like name changes
on buildings and few policies, if any, to combat police misconduct, many of which further
funded police departments.5 Furthermore, in the midst of hyperbolic media coverage of national
surges in violent crime over the last year, some state legislatures have in part turned back to
tough-on-crime beliefs and reversed their support of reform measures.6 While some states, like
New Jersey, New York, and California, have made significant progress over past decades in
reducing their incarcerated population, others continue to maintain extremely punitive penal
systems.7
In particular, Pennsylvania is an anomaly among its neighbors in terms of punishment.
The state maintains the highest incarceration rate per capita in the Northeast.8 Although the
current population in its state-run correctional facilities, 36,743, is its lowest since 2001, its
prison populations have drastically increased overall over the decades, rising by 504% between
1980 and 2016.9 Pennsylvania’s exceptionally punitive outlook is somewhat unexpected.
Scholars have traced how the histories of the South and Southwest, rooted in slavery, de jure
racial hierarchies, and restricted state power, have molded harsh traditions of mass incarceration
in states like Texas and Arizona. 10 Unlike “classically” punitive states in the former Confederacy,
Pennsylvania, as well as the Northeast at large, is historically rooted in a reformist political
culture. Louis N. Robinson, former Pennsylvania Board of Parole Chairman, writes that “prison

5

Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, “Did Last Summer’s Black Lives Matter Protests Change Anything?,” The New Yorker, August 6, 2021, accessed
December 14, 2021, https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/did-last-summers-protests-change-anything;
Sarah Holder, Fola Akinnibi, and Christopher Cannon, “‘We Have Not Defunded Anything’: Big Cities Boost Police Budgets,” Bloomberg
CityLab, September 22, 2020, accessed December 14, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2020-city-budget-police-defunding/.
6
TCR Staff, “State Legislatures Turn ‘Defensive’ on Justice Reform, Panel Told,” The Crime Report, March 8, 2022, accessed March 18, 2022,
https://thecrimereport.org/2022/03/08/state-legislatures-turn-defensive-on-justice-reform-panel-told/.
7
Marc Mauer and Nazgol Ghandnoosh, “Fewer Prisoners, Less Crime: A Tale of Three States” (The Sentencing Project, July 13, 2014),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Fewer-Prisoners-Less-Crime-A-Tale-of-Three-States.pdf.
8
ACLU, “Blueprint for Smart Justice: Pennsylvania” (American Civil Liberties Union, 2018).
9
“Gov. Wolf Announces Pennsylvania Prison Population Reaches 20-Year Low,” Pennsylvania Pressroom. October 7, 2021, accessed October
20, 2021, https://www.media.pa.gov/pages/corrections_details.aspx?newsid=522; ACLU, “Blueprint for Smart Justice.”
10
Michael C. Campbell, "Politics, Prisons, and Law Enforcement: An Examination of the Emergence of ‘Law and Order’ Politics in Texas," Law
& Society Review 45, no. 3 (September 1, 2011), 631-665. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5893.2011.00446.x; Mona Pauline Lynch, Sunbelt
Justice: Arizona and the Transformation of American Punishment (Stanford, CA: Stanford Law Books, 2010).
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reform in this country began in Philadelphia,” driven by Quaker thought and exemplified by the
19th-century “Pennsylvania system” of penology.11
Not only does Pennsylvania have the highest incarceration rate in the Northeast, it also
has the third highest rate nationwide of citizens on probation or parole, also known as
community supervision.12 When the Prison Policy Initiative categorized states by their amount of
correctional control, taking into account both incarceration and community supervision,
Pennsylvania was ranked second.13 Although often seen as a “better” alternative to incarceration,
probation is an alternative to freedom – a punishment in and of itself, and a pit stop in a long,
inescapable cycle of supervision and incarceration.
Probation is a proxy for understanding Pennsylvania’s process of executing reform and
why it remains a penal outlier. Advocates, legislators, journalists, and members of the public
called attention to the state’s community supervision practices when Meek Mill, a popular North
Philadelphia rapper who had cycled through a series of prison, probation, and parole sentences
for more than a decade, was re-imprisoned on a parole violation in 2017 for allegedly popping a
wheelie on a dirt bike.14 The REFORM Alliance, now a well-known national advocacy
organization, arose from this controversy. Following the viral #FreeMeek movement, probation
reform legislation has emerged multiple times, often championed by REFORM. The issue
remains salient today, and advocacy groups and media outlets continue to hotly support or
contest many such bills.15 However, probation reform legislation in Pennsylvania has been
11

LeRoy B. DePuy, “The Walnut Street Prison: Pennsylvania's First Penitentiary,” Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies 18,
no. 2 (April 1951): pp. 130-144. The Pennsylvania System extolled the use of solitary confinement and penal labor in place of torture as a way of
promoting self-reformation.
12
Vincent Schiraldi, “The Pennsylvania Community Corrections Story” (New York: Columbia University, April 25, 2018).
13
Wanda Bertram, “New Report Ranks States on ‘Correctional Control,’ Showing Huge State Disparities in Use of Probation,” Prison Policy
Initiative (Prison Policy Initiative, December 11, 2018), accessed March 2, 2021,
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2018/12/11/correctional-control/.
14
Hannah Giorgis, “The Revelations of Meek Mill's Legal Limbo,” The Atlantic, August 9, 2019, accessed October 20, 2021,
https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2019/08/free-meek-jay-z-and-trickiness-celebrity-activism/595768/.
15
Ron Southwick, “Pa. Lawmakers Push Again to Change Probation System, but Can They Get It Done?,” Penn Live, October 26, 2021, accessed
December 15, 2021,
https://www.pennlive.com/news/2021/10/pa-lawmakers-push-again-to-change-probation-system-but-can-they-get-it-done.html.
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largely unsuccessful, either in securing passage or in including measures that would seriously
reduce the state’s probation population. This situation exemplifies the difficulty of meaningfully
changing community supervision in the state.
This difficulty can be attributed to specific state-level institutional configurations and
power dynamics along the political-legal dimension. It is not enough to chalk up the lack of
reform to missing political will. As probation’s salience in state politics proves, there is a desire
to change the probation system in Pennsylvania. One must dig deeper to show why proposed
reforms continue to be defanged of more ambitious, decarceral initiatives. An analysis of this
nature would offer a first look at the structural elements that, if chipped away, could mean real
probation and criminal legal reform in Pennsylvania is within reach. Evidence presented here
could offer strategies for identifying and eradicating similar structural elements in other states,
hopefully facilitating more widespread reform that could transform the lives of millions under
carceral control in the United States.
The United States seems to be inching towards meaningful criminal legal reform, and the
public seems to increasingly reject mass incarceration. Why has Pennsylvania struggled to
reduce its extraordinarily high numbers of residents on probation? Why do reform measures that
are put forth fail to make serious dents in the massive reach of the probation system? In other
words, what sustains Pennsylvania’s status as a national outlier when it comes to community
supervision?
The following investigation into probation in Pennsylvania finds three cornerstone
elements which explain why reducing the state’s use of probation has been so difficult.
Subsequent to a literature review and a description of methodology, Chapter 1 examines the
many ways Pennsylvania’s political decentralization, especially in the probation system, fuels its
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institutional power. Because underfunded county departments struggle to function on their own,
the scope of future reforms are limited to those which allocate more funds to departments to
better supervise their increasing caseloads. A horizontal, devolved probation system also results
in escalating numbers of entrenched government and non-governmental probation stakeholders,
as the implementation of evidence-based practices demonstrates. Lastly, such a system poses
issues to anti-carceral activists, who struggle to identify oppositional actors and make broad calls
for change when conditions in various counties vary widely.
Chapter 2 focuses on the actions of the REFORM Alliance, the national, bipartisan
criminal justice advocacy organization founded by Meek Mill, Jay-Z, and Michael Rubin.
Bolstered by celebrity power and the wealth of its elite board, REFORM has held large influence
over recent probation reform bills, accommodating punitive amendments which would
strengthen mass supervision despite calls from numerous community organizers to do the
opposite. REFORM’s actions are based on its need to maintain an amenable reputation
nationwide, and in doing so, it reproduces neoliberal, elite ideologies which legitimize the
carceral state and sideline local advocates.
Finally, Chapter 3 considers how the Pennsylvania District Attorney’s Association
(PDAA) has achieved great control over the legislature, blocking or seriously altering probation
reform on the floor. An organization closely listened to by legislators, many believe the PDAA
speaks for all DAs in the state, a presumption that was somewhat challenged when Philadelphia
DA Larry Krasner, a “progressive prosecutor,” exited the association. Nevertheless, Krasner’s
inability or unwillingness to advocate against the PDAA on probation showcases the institution’s
continued ability to stop probation reform despite some fragmentation in prosecutorial politics.

9
Local Analyses, the Two-Pronged Politics of Reform, and Methodological Implications
Past literature clarifies why it is important to undertake a micro-level analysis of
Pennsylvania as opposed to a macro-level analysis of the United States. It also introduces a
framework to differentiate between reforms that strengthen or weaken carceral institutions.
Scholars have utilized a multitude of theoretical frameworks to explain the development
of the carceral state. Many scholars have taken a national or international approach, using
macro-level demographic and economic factors, to explain policy change. While David Garland
writes how contemporary responses to crime in the United Kingdom and the United States are
caused by social organization inherent in late modern society, Michael Tonry identifies the root
of America’s carceral buildup in the public’s harsh sensibilities, which cause moral panics and
cyclical, short-term swings in public attitudes.16 Jonathan Simon focuses on the American
government’s exploitation of fear of crime; he argues that by re-conceptualizing social problems
as criminal ones and the ideal citizen as a crime victim, it has increased its power to intervene in
everyday life and “govern through crime,” thus reshaping democracy.17 Furthermore, Loïc
Wacquant finds the criminal legal system functions to manage marginalized groups like Black
Americans, constituting the notion of race itself in a manner similar to the Jim Crow system.18
Katherine Beckett and Christopher Seeds also analyze important ideologies. Their works both
highlight that contemporary reform discussions, instead of representing progress, represent a
modification in which groups of individuals are “bifurcated” for different treatments under the

16

David Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001);
Michael H. Tonry, Thinking about Crime: Sense and Sensibility in American Penal Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
17
Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime: How the War on Crime Transformed American Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
18
Loïc Wacquant, “Deadly Symbiosis: When Ghetto and Prison Meet and Mesh,” Punishment & Society 3, no. 1 (2001): pp. 95-133,
https://doi.org/10.1177/14624740122228276.
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criminal legal system and fiscal arguments reign supreme.19 Such discourses re-entrench mass
incarceration.
However, many scholars alternatively claim that the most consequential penal policies
are formulated and executed at the state level, not the national level. Such scholars and their case
studies – Ruth Wilson Gilmore and Joshua Page (California), Vanessa Barker (California,
Washington, New York), Mona Lynch (Arizona), Heather Schoenfeld (Florida), and Lisa Miller
(Pennsylvania) – have all outlined how localized political dynamics shape the crime policies that
most affect residents.20 In fact, Miller’s work traces how the state crime policy process in
Pennsylvania involves overwhelming representation of interest groups representing criminal
legal agencies and professional or single-issue coalitions, while broader citizens’ groups
representing the poor and urban minorities at risk of violence are shut out.21 Barker succinctly
sums up the argument for a localized analysis preceding her own case studies:
Penal regime change, continuity, and difference are significantly shaped by localized
institutional configurations as well as by national and global trends...People tend to
experience and understand the common conditions of late modernity in ways that are
reflective of their immediate context, their past traditions, and in ways that help them
make sense of the changing world around them.22
While trends identified in macro-level analyses most certainly shape the conditions under which
local actors function – such as fundamental conceptions of citizenship, democracy, and crime, or
agenda-setting concerning which crime responses are ever considered – they cannot thoroughly

19

Katherine Beckett, Anna Reosti, and Emily Knaphus, “The End of an Era? Understanding the Contradictions of Criminal Justice Reform,” The
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 664, no. 1 (2016): pp. 238-259, https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716215598973;
Christopher Seeds, “Bifurcation Nation: American Penal Policy in Late Mass Incarceration,” Punishment & Society 19, no. 5 (2016): pp.
590-610, https://doi.org/10.1177/1462474516673822.
20
Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing California (Berkeley, CA : University of
California Press, 2007); Joshua Page, The Toughest Beat: Politics, Punishment, and the Prison Officers' Union in California (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2011); Vanessa Barker, The Politics of Imprisonment: How the Democratic Process Shapes the Way America Punishes
Offenders (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Mona Pauline Lynch, Sunbelt Justice: Arizona and the Transformation of American
Punishment (Stanford, CA: Stanford Law Books, 2010); Heather Schoenfeld, "Mass Incarceration and the Paradox of Prison Conditions
Litigation," Law & Society Review 44, no. 3 (2010), 731-767. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40926316; Lisa L. Miller, The Perils of Federalism:
Race, Poverty, and the Politics of Crime Control (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
21
Miller, The Perils of Federalism.
22
Barker, The Politics of Imprisonment.
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explain the outcomes of local politics on their own. Micro-level analyses can better discern the
specific processes that explicitly help or hinder certain forms of penal reform.
When determining which reforms can be considered “true reform” – that is, which
initiatives succeed in reducing Pennsylvania’s carceral footprint – one must distinguish between
“reformist reforms” and “non-reformist reforms.” Only non-reformist reforms will truly end the
state’s punitive penal regime.
A distinction first developed by André Gorz, reformist reforms aim to simply tweak the
status quo, while non-reformist reforms operate within the wider scope of human needs. As Gorz
writes, “a non-reformist reform is determined not in terms of what can be, but what should be.”23
Often a framework utilized by anti-carceral activists who distinguish between criminal legal
reform and prison and police abolitionist efforts, reformist reforms maintain or provide more
power to carceral institutions, while non-reformist reforms shrink their authority, funding, or
population under their control.
A variety of scholars in addition to Gorz, including Liat Ben-Moshe, Thomas
Matthiessen, Michelle Alexander, Marie Gottschalk, and Angela Y. Davis, have expanded upon
the dynamics of reformist reforms, examples of which include using electronic supervision as a
prison alternative, building more correctional facilities to address overcrowding, singling out
certain groups as exceptions to reform, or simply providing more funding and resources to law
enforcement and corrections divisions.24 Organizers with Critical Resistance contend that
reformist reforms are often “common reforms that create or expand cages anywhere, including
under the guise of ‘addressing needs’ or as ‘updated’ replacements.” 25 On the other hand,
23

Mark Engler and Paul Engler, “André Gorz's Non-Reformist Reforms Show How We Can Transform the World Today,” Jacobin, July 22, 2021,
accessed October 20, 2021, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2021/07/andre-gorz-non-reformist-reforms-revolution-political-theory.
24
Liat Ben-Moshe, "The Tension between Abolition and Reform," in The End of Prisons: Reflections from the Decarceration Movement, eds.
Mechthild E. Nagel and Anthony Nocella II J. (Amsterdam, Netherlands: Editions Rodopi B.V., 2013), 83-92; “Reformist Reforms vs.
Abolitionist Steps to End Imprisonment,” Critical Resistance (Community Resource Hub for Safety & Accountability, 2021), accessed February
2, 2022, https://communityresourcehub.org/resources/reformist-reforms-vs-abolitionist-steps-in-policing/.
25
Critical Resistance, “Reformist Reforms vs. Abolitionist Steps to End Imprisonment.”
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non-reformist or abolitionist reforms may entail decarceration, closing prisons, reducing funding
and contact with law enforcement, or creating new community infrastructure.26 In brief, while
reformist reforms maintain or increase the power and presence of carceral institutions,
non-reformist reforms, which Pennsylvania requires to pull back its penal regime, do the
opposite.
Reviewing the literature points towards the need to conduct a localized, qualitative case
study examining the intractability of modern-day probation in Pennsylvania and the difficulties
of achieving reform. Such an investigation effectively uncovers the institutional factors that
drives carceral reliance as seen in Pennsylvania’s probation system. To draw inferences, process
tracing methodology, which follows causal processes within a case as opposed to solely focusing
on original causes and final outcomes, is used. Specifically, a systems understanding of
mechanisms is employed, in which mechanisms are “systems of interlocking parts that transmit
causal powers or forces between a cause (or a set of causes).”27 Through this interpretation,
causal processes and their constituent components are explicitly unpacked in order to identify
how a combination of certain entities engaging in activities leads to the end result. Process
tracing therefore helps to understand how Pennsylvania institutions, both governmental and
nongovernmental, interact with each other to produce certain political dynamics in probation
reform.
A variety of sources form this research – news articles, reports from political and
advocacy groups, legislative archival materials, scholarly literature, and interviews with relevant
actors conducted from January to March of 2022. Ten people deeply involved in the case of
probation in Pennsylvania were interviewed, including those involved in governmental
26

Ibid.
Derek Beach, “Process-Tracing Methods in Social Science,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, January 25, 2017,
https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.176.
27
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administration (legislators, state officials), probation administration, and advocacy. A full list of
those interviewed can be found in the Appendix.

Background and Recent History of Probation in Pennsylvania
To contextualize Pennsylvania’s use of probation, the state’s rate of citizens on
community supervision is surpassed only by Georgia and Idaho.28 Restrictive policies allowing
for stacked probation terms, indeterminate sentencing, high rates of revocation (reimprisonment)
for technical violations, and more have resulted in a situation where 1 in every 34
Pennsylvanians are under community supervision and about a third of prison beds are taken by
those who violated their probation or parole conditions.29 Probation populations in Pennsylvania
have consistently grown despite national declines. In 2020, probation populations decreased in
42 states; on the other hand, Pennsylvania’s probation system saw an increase of 12,642 people,
the single biggest increase nationally.30
With 180,000 people on probation alone, Pennsylvania’s probation sentencing guidelines
are much more punitive than those of other states.31 While most states institute a maximum
length for probation sentences (often five years for felonies and two for misdemeanors),
Pennsylvania is one of eight states that allow both probation terms and incarceration in response
to probation violations to stretch up to the maximum penalty for the original offense.32
Notably, Pennsylvania maintains no probation sentencing guidelines for judges in
response to an offense or violation beyond the length of the maximum original penalty. Judges

28

Schiraldi, “The Pennsylvania Community Corrections Story.”
Ibid.
30
Danielle Kaeble, “Probation and Parole in the United States, 2020” (Bureau of Justice Statistics, December 2021), NCJ 303102,
https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppus20.pdf.
31
Southwick, “Pa. Lawmakers Push Again to Change Probation System”
32
Ibid; Samantha Melamed and Dylan Purcell, “Judges Rule,” The Philadelphia Inquirer, October 24, 2019, accessed December 15, 2021,
https://www.inquirer.com/news/inq/probation-parole-pennsylvania-philadelphia-judges-criminal-justice-system-20191024.html.
29
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may continue probation, issue a new term, or incarcerate a defendant as they wish.33 On average,
a Pennsylvania probation term is three years, but judges vary widely in their sentence lengths –
10% of probation terms are five years or longer – and sentences, especially when stacked, can
run decades.34 If a defendant’s initial offense received a sentence of up to 20 years (i.e. certain
drug-dealing charges), a 20-year probation term could be imposed post-release, in a practice that
juvenile justice policy expert Vincent Schiraldi calls “unheard of in many states.”35 A probation
violation – which could include missing an appointment with a probation officer, leaving the
county, failing to pay supervision fees, or not complying with arbitrary conditions like refraining
from certain locations, people, or behaviors – could even result in reimprisonment through the
revocation process or probation for another term of up to 20 years.36 In fact, over half of those in
Philadelphia’s jails are there because their supervision has been revoked.37
Such was the situation for Meek Mill. A 2007 charge dealt him more than a decade of
probation, in which he was repeatedly resentenced to prison on probation violations ranging from
performing without permission to reckless endangerment.38 Mill’s controversial reimprisonment
for two to four years for a 2017 parole violation led several prominent public figures to rally
around the rapper. As a result, the REFORM Alliance was founded in 2019 by Mill, rapper
Jay-Z, and Philadelphia 76ers co-owner Michael Rubin. The organization, which advocates for
parole and probation reform, garnered a long list of celebrity and business supporters.39 Five of
its ten-member Board of Directors are business or finance executives, and seven are billionaires
33

Melamed and Purcell, “Judges Rule.”
Ibid.
35
Schiraldi, “The Pennsylvania Community Corrections Story.”
36
Ibid; Human Rights Watch and American Civil Liberties Union, “Revoked: How Probation and Parole Feed Mass Incarceration in the United
States” (Human Rights Watch, July 2020),
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or married to billionaires (including Jay-Z and Rubin).40 As the Mill case drew increased
attention to probation in Pennsylvania, many probation reform bills were proposed, although
none have yet become law. A table more fully detailing the most relevant bills is in the
Appendix.
Advocacy and grassroots organizations in Pennsylvania had long been working on
probation reform measures even before REFORM’s entrance. For example, Senator Anthony
Williams (D-Philadelphia, Delaware) contacted the ACLU of Pennsylvania to work on a
probation bill multiple legislative sessions prior to him officially sponsoring the first major piece
of probation legislation in this time period.41 Community organizer Reuben Jones also recounts
that Senator Williams, Senator Sharif Street (D-Philadelphia), and Representative Jordan Harris
(D-Philadelphia), all future sponsors of influential probation legislation, were in favor of setting
hard caps on probation sentences in early meetings.42 Despite initial proposed measures
including elements that would drastically reduce the length of probation sentences and release
many from supervision, punitive amendments often watered down progressive intentions within
legislation over the course of debate.
For example, Senate Bill 14 gained widespread public attention when it was proposed in
the 2019-20 legislative session. Although the initial bill implemented caps for probation terms
and automatic measures to terminate probation, the final version (heavily influenced by the
amended version of an earlier bill, HB 1555) not only scrapped these more ambitious initiatives,
but created a new type of indefinite probation for failure to pay restitution.43 It also created
40
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burdensome mandatory probation reviews where none existed previously.44 Supported by the
REFORM Alliance, the PDAA, and legislators as a way to revamp the probation system, SB 14
was unanimously passed by the Senate.45 Here, the disconnect between the measures this alliance
proposed and the measures grassroots groups stress as crucial to decarceration was especially
apparent. As the REFORM Alliance continued to endorse the final bill, grassroots groups and the
ACLU, which was involved in initial legislative brainstorming, renounced their support and
publicly disavowed it.46 As the ACLU argued:
This bill makes probation worse. It will keep poor people on probation indefinitely
because they are unable to pay their restitution. It will make it easier to incarcerate people
for technical violations of probation...the bill creates a far more convoluted and restrictive
process for terminating probation than current law provides.47
SB 14 exemplifies a reformist reform shaped by elite interests that failed to address the
underlying problems with the probation system.
Senate Bill 913, proposed in the 2021-22 session, exhibited many of the same
characteristics as the amended SB 14. Instead of capping probation sentences or prohibiting
stacked and split sentencing practices, SB 913, like SB 14, invoked new authority to incarcerate
people on probation violations, established a form of indefinite probation for failure to pay
restitution, and instituted mandatory probation review conferences.48 Although the ACLU and 54
other grassroots, advocacy, and legal organizations released a joint statement in opposition to SB
913, it passed the Senate in a 46-4 vote on December 15, 2021, and awaits the House.49
It is clear that probation reforms that are seriously considered by legislators do not
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include changes, such as hard caps on probation term lengths, that would begin to alleviate the
mass supervision crisis in Pennsylvania. These measures actually give more authority to law
enforcement agencies to incarcerate probationers (those who are on probation), or make it more
difficult to facilitate releases. Given that many probation reform bills were more ambitious at
first, but later had punitive amendments tacked on, it is clear certain structures are interfering
with the success of reforms that would reduce the usage and intensity of probation. An
examination of political and legal dynamics in Pennsylvania finds that non-reformist probation
reform has been hindered due to devolution, the influence of the REFORM Alliance, and
institutionalized prosecutorial power held by the Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association.

Chapter 1: Devolution and Decentralization
Pennsylvania is an extraordinarily localized state. Since colonial times, localism – the
philosophy of investing more power in smaller-than-state geographical spaces rather than in state
governments – has exerted powerful influence on Pennsylvania’s political structure.50 With 4,897
local administrations, Pennsylvania now has more local governments than any state besides
Texas and Illinois.51
In alignment with this history, Pennsylvania’s probation system operates at the county
level, not the state level. It is one of just ten states that administers adult probation in this way.52
Pennsylvania has 65 adult county probation departments out of 67 counties in total.53 Each
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department is led by a county chief probation officer, and each department reports to the
President Judge of its corresponding judicial district.54
County probation departments in Pennsylvania have widely varying operations, resource
levels, and methods of criminal procedure. All administer supervision to those already sentenced
to probation via the courts. Although juvenile probation in Pennsylvania is also administered at
the county level, the Juvenile Court Judges Commission (JCJC), a state agency, provides the
broad oversight adult probation lacks.55 Contrastingly, JCJC’s adult counterpart, the County
Adult Probation and Parole Advisory Committee (CAPPAC), provides only non-binding
guidance on supervisory practices, probation administration, and funding.56 Thus, adult probation
practice in the state is minimally standardized.
The county probation system reflects the practice of devolution, in which institutions and
policies are delegated to lower levels of government as opposed to the state. With community
supervision rates skyrocketing over the last several decades, increasing numbers of
Pennsylvanians have fallen under the control of county probation departments. Though
“community” control over institutions is seen as an egalitarian shift, administering probation at
the county level does not change its primary functions, nor does it address the system’s problems
– astonishingly high rates of supervision, punitive surveillance measures, enduring practices
biased against poor and racial minority offenders, and more.
Research into devolution has described how it shrouds the responsibilities of governing
agencies and can lead to unequal policy applications and impacts.57 In a 2015 talk, the scholar
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Ruth Wilson Gilmore explained how devolution off-loads social welfare to state and non-state
institutions, limiting the efficacy of social services. With localities experiencing “new obligations
that are either unfunded mandates or tied to narrowly targeted funding streams,” devolution
“prevents the hands of the vulnerable from extracting the social wage.”58 Gilmore also writes that
“the dominant trend that goes hand-in-hand with mass incarceration is devolution.”59 Gilmore’s
scholarship illuminates the link between devolution and marginalization. As such, probation
reform in Pennsylvania demonstrates how devolution within agencies of the carceral state itself
further hinders efforts to reduce the number of people on probation.
In Pennsylvania, devolution makes non-reformist probation reform difficult. Firstly,
devolution and its resulting impacts on funding has led to chronically under-resourced probation
departments. This has pressured new reform efforts to include measures that reallocate yet more
funds to probation departments and has limited the discussion and viability of broad-based
interventions reducing the use of probation. Such a positive feedback loop permits the continued
sentencing of new offenders to community supervision. Secondly, devolution results in a
ballooning network of entrenched interests invested in the continued use of probation, as seen in
the large numbers of stakeholders involved in the shift towards evidence-based practices (EBP)
in many Pennsylvania counties. Thirdly, with counties varying widely in their approaches to
probation, devolution greatly complicates the efforts of Pennsylvania activists to expose
constitutional violations and challenge probation’s use.
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Underfunding: A Positive Feedback Loop
The county probation system faces serious struggles with funding. The burden of funding
is disproportionately borne by Pennsylvania counties and not the state. In FY 2013-14, when the
last study of the costs of Pennsylvania’s county adult probation system was coordinated, 58% of
total funding came from counties while just 8% came from the state.60 However, in the late
1990s, counties covered 45% and the state 20% of total costs.61 County funding capabilities
fluctuate widely between counties. The same study found that while 11% of Huntingdon
County’s funds came from the county, 85% of Bedford County’s funds came from the county.62
The state funding mechanism, the Grant-in-Aid (GIA) program, was amended in 1986 with the
goal of funding 80% of county probation staff salaries.63 GIA funding steadily diminished over
the decades that followed, and in FY 2013-14, it covered just 18% of eligible salaries. 64
Consequently, county probation departments have buckled under intense caseload
responsibilities. According to the most recently available Pennsylvania Board of Probation and
Parole (PBPP) Annual Statistical Report in 2018, the statewide average active caseload was 105
probationers per probation officer – more than double the American Probation and Parole
Association recommendation.65 Caseloads range from a low of 23 people per officer, as in
Sullivan County, to a high of 299 people per officer, as in Delaware County.66 According to April
Billet-Barclay, Director of York County Probation Services and President of the County Chief
Adult Probation and Parole Officers Association of Pennsylvania (CCAPPOAP), “caseloads are
high and continue to grow.”67 The CCAPPOAP, which supports hard caps on probation sentences
60

“Funding of County Adult Probation Services: Conducted Pursuant to House Resolution 2014-69” (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania General
Assembly, 2015), S-2.
61
Rick Jones, “Funding of County Adult Probation Services” (Legislative Budget and Finance Committee, 2015).
62
“Funding of County Adult Probation Services,” S-2.
63
Ibid, S-4.
64
Ibid, S-6.
65
“County Adult Probation and Parole Annual Statistical Report 2018” (Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 2018), 1.
66
Ibid.
67
Billet-Barclay, “Public Hearing on Justice Reinvestment II.”

21
and reducing officer caseloads, has frequently clashed with legislators over previously described
bills like HB 1555, SB 14, and most recently, SB 913. Helene Placey, CCAPPOAP’s Executive
Director, wrote in one such disagreement over HB 1555 that “there are a lot of individuals who
claim that they want probation reform, who don't seem to understand county probation.”68
With insufficient funding, increasing caseloads, and off-loaded responsibilities, county
probation departments in Pennsylvania are in a permanent state of crisis. Billet-Barclay explains
that “you can't focus on implementing change when you're carrying a caseload of 130 to 180
people…you’re struggling to survive.”69 One of the resulting effects is that criminal legal
reforms bend towards increasing funding for county probation departments, as opposed to
sweeping interventions that would reduce violence or the use of probation at large. Prioritizing
the manufactured, immediate crisis of underfunding over the sustained societal crisis of poverty
and carcerality reflects how Gilmore understands devolution as encouraging policies rooted in
“excessive narrowness.”70
Pennsylvania’s justice reinvestment movement showcases “excessive narrowness” in its
tendency to keep providing the probation system with more funding. Originally a reform
initiative aimed at allocating money used for prisons and jails back into community
infrastructure, in practice, justice reinvestment often entails directing funds for prisons and jails
back into other sectors of the criminal legal system, such as law enforcement agencies and
community corrections.71 As developed by political elites and law enforcement stakeholders as
opposed to citizens’ groups representing those most affected by incarceration and violence,
justice reinvestment in Pennsylvania is a reformist reform. In fact, the term’s originators Susan
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Tucker and Eric Cadora pointedly write it may “institutionalize our massive incarceration rates
for many decades to come.”72 Still, justice reinvestment is frequently praised by political leaders
nationally across party lines, leading Tucker and Cadora to state that “by focusing on state-level
political and administrative policymakers, the JRI process has too often marginalized
well-established local advocates and justice reformers who bring knowledge of local conditions
and politics to the table, and who have a vested interest in providing long-term implementation
oversight and ensuring sustainability of reforms.”73
Pennsylvania legislators have repeatedly supported justice reinvestment, undertaking
Justice Reinvestment Initiative I (JRI I) in 2012 and Justice Reinvestment Initiative II (JRI II) in
2019, while rooting both efforts in county probation’s need for more resources. After JRI I, the
state boasted it was able to provide $8.5 million in law enforcement grants and $5 million to
county probation departments with the money saved.74 Although populations under supervision
and corrections spending continued to increase past 2012, JRI I was considered a success by
Pennsylvania leaders and the Council of State Government Justice Center, an association of state
government officials which has spearheaded justice reinvestment across the country.75 JRI II
funded the new probation advisory committee (CAPPAC), created authority to detain parolees
for reimprisonment and revoke probation, and revised sentencing guidelines, including
establishing mandatory minimums for certain crimes against minors.76 Pennsylvania’s JRI II
working group composition reveals this initiative’s base of support. Out of 36 members, only two
represent public defenders, and no community groups are represented; the majority are
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government officials or representatives of police, prison, probation, or prosecutorial
departments.77 In seeking to improve aspects of the probation system, justice reinvestment
prioritizes elite and pro-carceral voices, providing the probation system with more resources to
punish.
Increasing funding to county probation incentivizes the maintenance and escalation of
correctional control. Billet-Barclay reports that more funding would “allow county probation
departments to further address caseload size,” such as by hiring new officers.78 As Kay Whitlock
and Nancy Heitzeg illustrate in Carceral Con, the current moment of “reform bipartisanship”
consistently presents “the regime of overcriminalization and mass imprisonment as problematic
not because of its harm to criminalized individuals, but because of its strain on budgets, its
inefficiency, and its failure to produce meaningful ‘public safety.’”79 In doing so, proposed
reforms do not invest in social services, but instead fund “more training, new agencies, or
additional technology” in an attempt to perfect the process of criminalization.80 Such practices
expand and institutionalize correctional control and the salaries of those who sustain it.81 Funding
county probation departments, as JRI 2 did, reaffirms the structurally violent purpose of
probation. It continues a positive feedback loop that would increase the reach of the carceral state
disguised by the desire for “better” supervisory practices, and embolden judges to sentence even
more to probation, sparking yet more funding needs.
Devolution results in underfunded county probation departments struggling to fulfill
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dispersed state responsibilities, and it shrinks the scope of future reform to just revolve around
giving county probation additional resources. This phenomenon does not imply that funding
county probation departments more would alleviate the inherent, problematic nature of
community supervision; doing so would exacerbate it. Identifying the structural conditions that
lead to these reformist reforms sustaining supervision, though, can help counter narratives that
make non-reformist reform difficult. Dolly Prabhu, Staff Attorney with the Abolitionist Law
Center, notes that public education distinguishing between anti-carceral and pro-carceral reforms
– namely, those which reject or promote government spending on state control – has proven
effective.82 This is critical if the feedback loop is to be interrupted.

Entrenched Interests and Evidence-Based Practices
Devolution has increased the sheer number of stakeholders supporting the sustained use
of probation, causing institutional entrenchment and impeding reform in Pennsylvania. With 65
county probation departments operating separately, every initiative departments undertake
multiplies the number of political actors, external contractors, and service providers partnered
with the probation system. Donald Kettl documents this phenomenon nationally, writing that
partnerships with other governmental and nongovernmental agencies have rapidly expanded at
all levels of government, especially the state and local levels.83 He also points to how this type of
horizontal growth in government “muddies accountability,” and asks how society can “ensure
accountability in extended service networks where administrative responsibility is widely shared
and where no one is truly in charge.”84
Scholars have investigated how devolution in Pennsylvania’s juvenile justice system has
82

Dolly Prabhu, interview by Srinidhi Ramakrishna, February 1, 2022.
Kettl, “The Transformation of Governance,” 494.
84
Ibid.
83

25
constructed an extremely robust private-sector network linked to youth corrections. Reimbursed
with public money, external providers invested in expanding juvenile detention programming
increase the punitive reach of the state. Through private community programs and political
alliances, local-level punishment in Pennsylvania is entrenched. As policy solutions grow local,
neoliberal ideology locates criminal behavior in individual behavioral defects, especially through
the adoption of the evidence-based practices movement. Bolstered by goals of fiscal austerity in
light of an underfunded county system, Sarah Cate writes that “the only valid solution to
delinquency continues to be through individualized behavioral interventions carried out by the
private-sector at the local level,” not social or economic structural change limiting deprivation
and violence at large.85 County-level juvenile justice officials and politicians in Pennsylvania
together claim that contracting out to the private-sector cuts costs and addresses criminality.86
Although Pennsylvania’s adult probation system has not been privatized to the extent of the
juvenile system, its devolution and steady incorporation of more external interests reflects Cate’s
analysis.
The rise of evidence-based practices (EBP) in the adult probation system after initially
being adopted by the juvenile system escalates the horizontality of county probation and
threatens to further entrench probation. Justified as a cost-saving measure that improves public
safety by probation officials, EBP is defined as “the application of science into operational
practice for services and programs for offenders.”87 The use of various actuarial risk assessment
tools to evaluate individual’s risk levels (i.e. low risk, moderate risk, high risk) and needs is
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considered the “foundation of EBP” in Pennsylvania.88 Such tools – like the popular Ohio Risk
Assessment System – are informed by “risk, need, and responsivity” principles, that dictate who
to supervise most intensely, which “criminogenic needs” to address during supervision, and what
services will positively engage probationers. Another important component of EBP is
motivational interviewing, an approach originating in the medical field that aims to address
“criminogenic” risk factors by modifying how officers talk with those on probation. Motivational
interviewing centers on “engaging the offender more and focusing on motivation to change,”
such as by encouraging them to recognize the harmful effects of their behavior.89 Scholars note
that the usage of motivational interviewing represents probation departments moving into the
“business of behavior change.”90
Despite the words “evidence-based practices” (EBP) hinting at a tamer, more lenient
iteration of the criminal legal system, EBP expands, not reduces, correctional control over
individuals. By attempting to stop crime at an individual level via psychological coercion, and by
developing new methods to manage large populations of justice-impacted individuals more
efficiently, EBP promotes the idea that the state’s role is to closely surveil groups deemed as
unruly.91 Indeed, probation administrators interviewed embrace EBP not because the current
system is morally objectionable, but because EBP saves money and provides supposedly
data-driven, scientifically backed results.92 They also mention the complications of implementing
EBP due to large disparities in long-standing practices among different county probation
departments.93 Regardless, as EBP is slowly adopted, it ignites a greater problem. Because EBP
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multiples the number of stakeholders involved in administering probation and reinscribes the
value of carceral practices like probation under the neoliberal guise of “data-driven” practices, it
cuts off the possibility of dismantling probation in and of itself.
Placey, for example, explains how Pennsylvania probation departments are working
closely with a national consulting firm, The Carey Group, to roll out adult EBP.94 The Carey
Group was also involved in launching EBP within the juvenile system, and much overlap exists
between the juvenile and adult probation systems in Pennsylvania – 39 county chiefs oversee
both juvenile and adult probation services.95 The CCAPPOAP and several county probation
departments are also working with additional external contractors: the Alliance for Criminal
Justice Innovation, for implementation leadership training; the Center for Strength-Based
Strategies, to train staff in motivational interviewing; the University of Cincinnati Corrections
Institute, to provide additional training to officers; BTM Software Solutions and Connenctrex, to
install case management systems with better data capabilities, and others.96 The backing of more
external and internal stakeholders, like county commissioners, district attorneys, defense counsel,
correctional facilities, victim services, treatment providers, judges, and probation staff, is also
crucial to administering EBP.97
York County’s probation system and its EBP-derived forays into healthcare demonstrates
how a devolved probation system and resulting expansion of stakeholders entrenches carcerality.
Billet-Barclay, York’s Director of Probation Services, underscores the “heartbreaking”
criminalization of those with mental illness in which mentally ill offenders are wrongfully
incarcerated in an attempt to force compliance with treatment.98 Billet-Barclay then argues that
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one of the main problems with typical mental health services is that they are voluntary.99 As she
states, instead of telling the criminal justice system to “deal with” mentally ill offenders who do
not want mental health treatment, mental health practitioners need to “step up more” and
integrate into the probation system, as in her own county.100 Importantly, Billet-Barclay’s view
does not consider the need for affordable mental healthcare access for individuals before they
enter the criminal legal system, nor does it consider the dangerous effects of integrating
probation and health care. In 2021, York County partnered with a private health provider,
WellSpan Health, to create the Special Treatment and Recovery Team (START) clinic – a
“one-stop shop” where probation, reentry, mental health, and physical health services are
consolidated under one roof.101 According to Billet-Barclay, START represents “breaking down
the silos between the systems…for the betterment of the individual.”102
START demonstrates how increasing numbers of local, non-carceral social services can
grow enmeshed with the probation system, especially when managed at the county level.
Although there is a pressing need to support the health of justice-impacted individuals, START
reveals tensions when viewed through the lens of coercive care.103 When probation officers
mandate health care for probationers under the threat of revocation – which would entail forced
removal from one’s home and family – they send harmful, mixed messages. Studies in other
counties nationwide that integrate health and probation services find that the threat of revocation,
as a health stressor in and of itself, is associated with worsened health given the invasive
conditions of probation.104 In other words, probation is a major health stressor. It is also
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damaging to bring into probation’s fold even more social service providers that may begin to rely
on the use of probation to sustain their institutions. START reinforces that some “community”
solutions that integrate probation into daily life entrench punitive practices at the local level by
requiring probationers and those who deliver probation-related services to have even more
contact with the carceral state.
As exemplified by EBP implementation and START, devolution encourages opportunities
to privatize probation and incorporate external stakeholders, entrenching the carceral state and
making reform difficult.

Devolution and Anti-Carceral Activism
One of the most explicitly detrimental aspects of decentralization on probation reform is
the problem it presents to anti-carceral activists. With little regulatory oversight from the
Pennsylvania state government, county departments enact varying interpretations of probation
services, supervisory conditions, and criminal procedure. Such carceral geographies complicate
the options available for anti-carceral activists to challenge probationary practices. Gilmore
writes:
“The doctrine of devolution results in a constantly fragmenting array of centers of
struggle and objects of antagonism for people who seek equal protection, to say nothing
of opportunity. In crisis, in resistance, in opposition: To whom, at whom, against whom
does one carry one’s petition or raise one’s fist?”105
Anti-carceral activists in Pennsylvania struggle to determine the scope of the problem, which of
the 67 counties to focus on, and the best-suited strategies for different community landscapes. As
most activist groups are based in Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, or Harrisburg, devolution also hinders
the formation of broad, state-wide coalitions encompassing both urban and rural locales in the
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state.
Every activist group interviewed brought up how the structural conditions of devolution
make their advocacy harder. Elizabeth Randol, Legislative Director at the ACLU of
Pennsylvania, emphasizes that if any proactive changes in the probation system are to occur, they
must come from the county level.106 Given a consistent trend of legislators advocating for
actively harmful probation bills, Randol says the ACLU has considered not relying on the
legislature for change at all.107 However, fragmentation and the “wildly different ways courts
operate and probation departments work” pose a roadblock to county-level advocacy.108 For
example, some counties do not lodge probation detainers at all, while others fill the majority of
their jails with pretrial populations on detainers.109 Launching multiple localized challenges to
supervisory practices strains the resources of activists in ways that consolidated, state-level
campaigns do not.
Prabhu describes how different counties have endless minute, but important, differences
in criminal procedure related to probation sentencing, hampering the Abolitionist Law Center’s
(ALC) work. As she reports, “there's so many questions just for one single county, there’s no
way to get those answers for every small county across the state. [Fact gathering] was the biggest
challenge, and [it] took a really long time.”110 Data collection and record-keeping – if counties
agree to divulge data with the ALC at all – is inconsistent, preventing its staff from identifying
patterns. Because no standardized processes exist, it is difficult for the ALC to “even show there
are certain policies and practices are in place that are perpetuating constitutional violations.”111
Devolution obscures the responsibility of probation and frustrates the possibility of statewide
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bottom-up movements for material change in the use and conditions of probation across
Pennsylvania.
Altogether, carceral devolution in Pennsylvania emerges as a key underlying institutional
factor that makes Pennsylvania an outlier and obstructs non-reformist reforms. With probation
populations and unfunded state mandates increasing, under-resourced county probation
departments’ constant state of crisis results in constrained political imaginations. Reforms further
fund probation departments due to their immediate financial needs and fail to explore
non-reformist paths that would bring about the defunding of mass supervision. The resulting
ideological dominance of fiscal austerity contributes to the rise of phenomena like EBP –
multifaceted initiatives involving numerous external, private collaborators which entrench the
legitimacy of probation. Because of devolution, these initiatives threaten to exponentially
increase the numbers of people and institutions who are invested in the probation system. Such
programs, deployed at the community level, also ensure punitive practices bleed into the very
fabric of local life. Finally, devolution hinders the efforts of activists, who cannot adequately
assess the current landscape of probation or easily coordinate coalitional, state-level goals.
This does not imply a centralized probation system would make probation “better” or
more humane for those who undergo its intrusive conditions. However, understanding how
devolution is deployed, by design or not, to maintain the carceral state, is critical to combat the
narratives it accompanies and challenge the legitimacy of probation from the ground up. In other
words, the structure of probation must first be understood in order to work against it.

Chapter 2: The REFORM Alliance
While devolution at the local level hinders attempts to decrease the use of probation,
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interest groups in Pennsylvania are also key in shaping state legislative decisions regarding
probation legislation. The power of interest groups is not a phenomenon specific to
Pennsylvania, but the groups at hand – the REFORM Alliance and the Pennsylvania District
Attorney’s Association (PDAA) – reveal unique political dynamics. As a newly formed,
high-profile national organization, REFORM’s entrance into Pennsylvania highlighted power
hierarchies and provoked a situation already influenced by the powerful, tough-on-crime PDAA.
The next two chapters investigate these two interest groups.
Lisa Miller’s analysis of Pennsylvania state politics finds that the types of interest groups
who participate in legislative processes are lopsided. Data on the legislature’s crime hearings
from 1965 to 2004 shows criminal legal agencies to be overrepresented. Nearly 40% of
witnesses in such hearings were police, prosecutors, corrections officers, judges, and related
actors.112 Professional associations made up the next most represented interest groups, while
citizens’ groups comprised just 14% of witnesses. 113 Even so, such citizens’ groups tended to be
high-profile or single-issue groups such as the ACLU or Mothers Against Drunk Driving
(MADD).114 Notably, broader citizens’ groups advocating for racial minorities or the urban poor,
who are most at risk of crime victimization, are “almost entirely absent from state legislative
hearings on crime.”115 This absence is amplified by Pennsylvania’s decentralization, which
localizes the legislative venues broad citizens’ groups seek to enter. 116
The state legislative process maintains differentiated routes of access to influence.
Identifying certain interest groups like state agencies, the PDAA, MADD, and more as “frequent
fliers” who have regular interactions with legislators, Miller writes:
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As with congressional hearings, legislative hearings in Pennsylvania are hardly
democratic affairs. Groups are either on or off the legislative radar. When they are on it,
they sometimes receive an invitation to a public hearing…Public hearings and
informational meetings are generally well‐coordinated affairs consisting of scheduled
speakers and/or organized panels of participants.117
Pennsylvania’s political landscape omits the viewpoints of community organizations and
grassroots groups representing the poor and racial minorities, reserving influence for certain
favored interest groups and lobbyists. It is prone to high-profile advocacy groups focused on a
single issue like REFORM, or prosecutor-oriented interest groups like the PDAA, having an
outsize impact on the scope of probation reform. Indeed, Prabhu notes that “probation reform is
one of the easiest ways for far-right, conservative groups, or even just liberal groups that are
pro-carceral for many reasons, to latch on and support what seems like a positive criminal justice
reform bill.”118 Given how reforms to probation, which is often seen as an alternative to
incarceration instead of a punitive measure in and of itself, can be disguised as beneficial, the
interplay between REFORM, the PDAA, and the Pennsylvania legislature is crucial to
understanding how probation is institutionalized.

REFORM, Legislation, and Advocacy
The founding of the REFORM Alliance led political actors, media figures, and many
members of the public to champion co-founders Meek Mill, Jay-Z, and Michael Rubin as
symbols of criminal justice reform. Upon its launch, REFORM recruited political commentator
Van Jones as its CEO. A variety of business leaders and venture capitalists became founding
partners, including Nets co-owner Clara Wu Tsai, hedge fund executive Daniel Loeb,
cryptocurrency tycoon Michael Novogratz, private equity investor Robert Smith, and Patriots
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owner and Trump confidante Robert Kraft.119 The organization employs both conservative and
liberal policy staff and consistently emphasizes its bipartisan approach.120 REFORM has captured
significant media attention and many celebrity and business endorsements. Simultaneously,
REFORM and its founders have garnered controversy over their support of harmful criminal
justice measures and misguided uses of wealth, including a recent $15 million scholarship
donation for underserved youth who attend private and parochial schools in Philadelphia that
was criticized for undermining the public education system.121 REFORM’s work in Pennsylvania
reveals how the dominance of elite-driven activism sparks elite-grassroots tensions and hinders
anti-carceral probation reform.
Although REFORM has since worked in other states, its first major legislative action was
to introduce HB 1555 in Pennsylvania in 2019 after reaching out to state Representatives Jordan
Harris (D-Philadelphia) and Sheryl Delozier (R-Cumberland) to draft a probation reform bill.122
Thereafter, REFORM has commanded significant power in the legislature. As discussed earlier,
the initial version of HB 1555 included caps on probation sentences, earned time credits, and
early termination language. However, amendments by House Judiciary Committee chairman Rob
Kauffman (R-Franklin) eliminated caps and many early termination provisions while appending
clauses that recommended incarceration for certain offenses, allowed warrantless searches, and
instituted mandatory probation review conferences.123
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HB 1555 was eventually removed from the table in the House. That same year, a copycat
bill, SB 14, was introduced in the Senate by Senators Anthony Williams (D-Philadelphia,
Delaware), Lisa Baker (R-Luzerne, Susquehanna, Pike, Wayne, Wyoming), and Camera
Bartolotta (R-Beaver, Washington, Greene) with the support of REFORM.124 Sparking
controversy, the amended SB 14 scrapped initial measures to implement term caps as well as
bans on split and stacked sentencing which would prevent excessively long probation sentences;
it also removed provisions for automatic termination of probation.125 Instead, it added avenues to
incarceration for technical violations, punitive measures towards those in need of drug or mental
health treatment, and indefinite probation for those who could not pay restitution.126 Importantly,
although Pennsylvania law currently allows judges to terminate probation at any time, SB 14
also developed a convoluted, far less attainable process of “mandatory probation review
conferences” after three or five years before probation termination could even be considered.127
The ACLU described the path towards receiving such a hearing as a “byzantine maze of
eligibility requirements, exclusions, and trip wires contained in a process that only gets a person
to a ‘probation review conference’ with no guarantee that probation is terminated.” 128 Placey and
Billet-Barclay, who endorse automatic early termination, vocally opposed this measure as
burdensome and archaic to what individual counties were currently implementing.129 Community
organizers, too, opposed HB 1555 and SB 14.130 Regardless, REFORM stood by the bill, and was
named in Senator Williams’ final statement on its passage as a key collaborator. 131
After passing the Senate unanimously, SB 14 was never voted on by the House and it
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failed to advance.132 REFORM was next involved in the development of SB 913, which passed
the Senate on December 15, 2021 and awaits consideration in the House.133 Without even
initially attempting caps on sentences like HB 1555 and SB 14 did, SB 913 was largely based on
the amended version of SB 14, with measures for mandatory probation review conferences and
new authority to incarcerate based on technical violations.134 Hailed by legislators, REFORM,
and the Pennsylvania Safety Coalition (a broad conglomerate of organizations including
REFORM and conservative groups such as the American Conservative Union, Americans for
Prosperity, and the Faith & Freedom Coalition) as beneficial due to its earned time credit system
and removal of the often-abused ability to revoke a probationer for simply leaving a jurisdiction,
SB 913 still greatly increases the reach of the probation system.135 By permitting the state to lock
up more probationers, creating new punishments and duplicative offenses, and further
complicating the probation process, SB 913 dilutes the meaning of reform. Fifty-five community
organizations and advocacy groups signed a joint statement urging state senators to oppose the
bill; probation stakeholders Placey and Billet-Barclay also objected to its measures.136 In light of
these defections, REFORM’s staunch loyalty to SB 913 continues to draw criticism.
It is crucial to contextualize the relative power REFORM holds in Pennsylvania’s
legislative process, especially compared to local advocacy organizations. As a high-profile
national organization led by wealthy celebrity and business elites, REFORM wields enormous
funding, media influence and lobbying access. Because it is a single-issue group focused on
probation and parole, it can also concentrate its funding onto one campaign in ways broad
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organizations like the ACLU and other citizens’ groups cannot. 137 REFORM additionally
benefits from its “good faith bipartisan reputation” of being able to work with groups on the left
and right, a reputation developed in part because of the networks of its board members and key
staff members.138 In describing how REFORM could grow its influence and work with him, Rep.
Harris stated that, not unlike other organized interest groups, it “had the resources to hire
government affairs professionals to advocate for their issues…who have relationships with
legislators where you could get a meeting.”139 On the contrary, “some grassroots groups may not
know how to go about advocating.”140 Through its ability to hire swathes of professional policy
experts, REFORM effectively maneuvers the formalized governmental process and presents
itself in a way which resonates with legislators.
Unlike other single-issue national advocacy organizations, REFORM operates with
unmatched media power and influence that only an organization led by celebrities known
worldwide could have. Rep. Harris highlights that REFORM has a voice, saying that “Meek got
tens of millions of followers. Mike Rubin had hundreds of thousands of followers, Van Jones has
hundreds of thousands of followers and was on CNN…they can get to my constituents.”141 As a
result, many legislators may be inclined to work with REFORM for positive media attention
other groups may not bring. Accordingly, Randol mentions that “legislators who are solicitous of
media attention, or who might be looking to run for a leadership position or another office…they
can point to the high profile things that [they] did.”142 One source, who wished to remain
anonymous, hinted at REFORM’s off-book lobbying practices with legislators, such as getting
their family members tickets to concerts, music festivals, or basketball games. Because they do
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not have a political action committee, REFORM’s explicit financial contributions are hard to
ascertain. Still, the cultural power it holds is a compelling draw for Pennsylvania legislators.
REFORM’s legislative efforts are also distinguished by its remarkable accommodation of
punitive changes that anti-carceral organizers, probation officers, and even internal stakeholders
within REFORM disagree with. Both Britton Smith, REFORM’s Senior Organizing Strategist,
and Rep. Harris state that they were never in favor of the amendments to SB 14 or HB 1555.143
Smith explains that REFORM continued to endorse the bill in order to present a good-faith show
of support to maintain its bipartisan reputation and hopefully rework the bill later on in the
House.144 Randol describes this all-consuming desire for a success as harmful, such that “in the
mad dash to get across the finish line, sometimes they've accommodated so many changes and
amendments to a bill that they're left with some pile of carnage that they're dragging across the
finish line to get to the win.”145 Distorting its own initial goals, REFORM’s concessions threaten
to expand probation.
This strategy is closely linked to REFORM’s status as a national organization operating
in multiple states, functionally removed from local dynamics. Unlike the slow work of grassroots
movement building, the drive to build a national reputation privileges individual, visible forms of
success – such as bills passed – in order to more clearly grow delocalized power and publicize
one’s work to broader audiences. As expected, Smith agrees that one of the reasons REFORM
continually endorsed the bills they did, even if it contradicted their initial goals, was to maintain
an agreeable reputation for campaigns in other states.146 On the other hand, Reuben Jones,
Executive Director of Frontline Dads and a Philadelphia-based community organizer, explains
how organizers do not measure success by grabbing wins or headlines. He and his peers
143
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prioritize changing the narrative in the long run through generating conversations on the ground
and individually meeting with legislators, even if doing so does not result in immediate
legislative outcomes.147 Unlike REFORM, Jones notes that “we preferred no bill to a bill that
contributed to expanding the carceral system,” highlighting his emphasis on gradual movement
work and value consistency.148
A focus on individualized instances of success has warped understandings of current
probation conditions and the line between positive and negative reform, permitting legislators to
characterize bills like SB 14 as at least a small step in the right direction. Moreover, the impact
of REFORM’s accommodation to pro-carceral amendments is not limited to the legislation.
Randol notes that before the vote on SB 14, “every comment on the Senate floor right before the
vote was like one long subtweet,” with Democratic senators in particular expressing veiled
criticism of the ACLU and grassroots groups in opposition by remarking that that “some are
going to say it doesn’t have caps, but…we can’t always get everything we want.”149 REFORM’s
entry has caused a spiraling effect in which its acquiescence to punitive, conservative measures
portrays the ACLU and other grassroots groups as obstructionist and demanding in comparison,
hurting the latter’s future ability to advocate for progressive probation reforms.150 Tellingly, when
interviewed, Rep. Harris’ most critical comments were levied not against tough-on-crime
conservative lawmakers, but against those on the left “jumping up and down screaming and
shouting that ‘this isn’t doing enough, this is going to make things worse.’”151
REFORM’s advocacy is bolstered by a wealth of resources local organizations
advocating for probationers and the formerly incarcerated do not have. In part due to its actions,

147

Jones, interview.
Jones, “An Open Letter to Meek Mill.”
149
Randol, interview.
150
Randol, interview.
151
Harris, interview.
148

40
harmful legislative ideas capture more political ground. Its strategy of positioning itself as
amenable to conservatives results in increasingly punitive measures disguised as reform, and
threatens to further jeopardize the power grassroots organizations hold in Harrisburg long after
REFORM leaves the state.

REFORM, Celebrity Activism, and the National Elite
REFORM’s policy positions and modes of operation are closely tied to neoliberal
ideology and its elite leadership. The Made in America music festival, a multi-day concert series
founded by Jay-Z held on Philadelphia’s Benjamin Franklin Parkway, features the “Cause
Village,” an area reserved for social justice organizations to set up tent stations. In 2019, the
REFORM Alliance, one of the festival’s main charity partners, maintained a branded truck and a
fenced-off turf section in Cause Village.152 Throughout the day, volunteers and REFORM staff
were at this station preparing flyers and handing out materials. At one point, several volunteers
were in the truck setting up their next task when they were suddenly told to exit – Ben Simmons,
then-star 76ers basketball player, was going to arrive for a celebrity appearance and needed the
truck. After being quickly ushered off to the margins of the fenced-off area, a disgruntled
volunteer spoke up. Why was REFORM catering to celebrities? Were they not an organization
“for the community?”153
This anecdote demonstrates how the REFORM Alliance must be analyzed through a lens
of celebrity activism, Black celebrity activism in particular, and the relationship of both to
neoliberalism. With increased technology and globalization, large advocacy groups have
increasingly claimed to represent all by focusing on non-residential concerns, facilitating
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increased participation by the “power elite” such as celebrities.154 Literature on the role of
celebrities in politics highlight how as elite, non-state agents, celebrities may shape public
opinion but do not undergo processes of public accountability, like elections.155 They derive
influence from their wealth, relationships with other elites, and sociocultural currency enabling
them to hold the attention of the public.156 This concept, termed by Archer et al. as “epistemic
power,” enables celebrities to influence others’ beliefs while either enabling or disabling others
from doing the same.157 One of the most relevant applications of epistemic power is
agenda-setting, or the ability to specify both the subject and scope of public debates.158
To be sure, epistemic power is not a phenomenon unique to celebrities, and some forms
of epistemic power are entirely legitimate. REFORM’s epistemic power is partially derived from
its employment of professional policy experts and strategists. However, a large part of
REFORM’s epistemic power is also driven by its association with celebrities like Mill and Jay-Z
– celebrities who express their views and lend credence towards others involved with REFORM
like Rubin, Kraft, and policy staff. For example, Van Jones stated that REFORM’s “trick” is that
it has “major celebrities and billionaires setting the table.”159 Thus, REFORM is empowered to
define the most pressing problems with probation and the possible breadth of reforms while
discrediting others who imagine different scopes for reform that do not involve elites at the helm.
Scholars have also linked celebrity activism to neoliberalism, reflected in the policy
advocacy of REFORM. Nathan Farrell writes how celebrity activism is often aligned with
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dominant state political-economic ideologies, even if the celebrities in particular maintain
“outsider” images.160 According to Farrell, solutions proposed by celebrity activists are generally
rooted in neoliberal frameworks, shaped by wealthy business elites and framed around notions of
individual responsibility.161 The fact that REFORM’s work is a bipartisan collaboration with
venture capitalists, financial executives, and technology magnates no doubt shapes the policy
solutions it advances. The organization’s public messaging and statements by those in support of
REFORM-backed bills emphasize their moderation, with politicians repeatedly stating that they
reward good behavior, only help people who had committed minor technical violations, and
better match the punishment to the crime.162 In an interview, Van Jones insisted that REFORM is
solely focused on non-systemic reform in situations where an upstanding probationer commits a
non-criminal technical violation long after their initial crime, not addressing the excessive use of
punishment as a response to crime itself.163 This discourse demonstrates the neoliberal practice of
“bifurcation” – separating out certain people as personally deserving of reform while maintaining
or increasing punishment towards others – which dismisses comprehensive anti-carceral change
and which Seeds and Beckett note is endemic to the modern criminal legal system.164
The work of REFORM is also related to the long tradition of Black celebrity activism in
politics. Scholars note that Black actors, musicians, and athletes are considered to have a
“responsibility” to advocate on behalf of Black people.165 However, as a Fox News host’s
notorious comment towards LeBron James to “shut up and dribble” exemplified, the
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acceptability of celebrity activism is racialized.166 With this in mind, it is undeniably powerful for
Meek Mill, someone with lived experience of prison and probation, to lead REFORM.
Nevertheless, Jay-Z’s involvement with REFORM and long history of past activism also
draws attention to REFORM’s association with racial neoliberalism and Black capitalism.
Jay-Z’s musical expressions and cultural symbolism as a rags-to-riches icon have long
exemplified the trend of the neoliberal “hip-hop mogul.”167 His consistent uplift of the wealth
accumulation of individual Black people as momentous anti-racist acts, divorced from realities
of class inequality, has been criticized for embracing corporate-driven solutions while
marginalizing other Black activists.168 After Jay-Z agreed to produce the Super Bowl halftime
performance despite calls for him to boycott the NFL because of its lockout of athlete-activist
Colin Kaepernick, abolitionist Derecka Purnell asserted that Jay-Z is a “quintessential black
capitalist: professing that freedom is one’s ability to own oneself and acquire wealth.”169 While
his work with REFORM stems from genuine care, “the same forces that create and maintain
billionaires rely on what Jay-Z is seemingly critical of: racism, poverty, xenophobia,
incarceration and homophobia.”170 Jay-Z’s neoliberal politics are echoed by Mill and bleed into
REFORM’s activities. The organization’s elite-driven structure produces solutions which fail to
seriously transform the carceral system.
Pointedly, REFORM represents a specific type of Black neoliberal celebrity activism that
has sidelined Black community organizers in Pennsylvania. Reuben Jones – a formerly
incarcerated person who spent fifteen years in prison before becoming a community organizer
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with a multitude of groups involved in supporting other returning citizens, reducing gun
violence, and working against mass incarceration – published an open letter to Mill in January
2022. The letter details Jones’ disappointment with REFORM, given how it has sidelined
community organizations, especially those led by formerly incarcerated people.171 Though HB
1555, SB 14, and SB 913 were resoundingly opposed by organizers, Jones says REFORM
“trampled over the voices of formerly incarcerated leaders like [him]self” by continuing to
endorse the bills and not adequately consulting with directly impacted people.172 Jones, also a
former probationer who is now on parole, connects REFORM’s exclusion of formerly
incarcerated people to the stereotype that they are “not intelligent enough, or well-versed
enough, or researched enough on this topic to represent it publicly.”173 He even hints that other
organizers have heard REFORM executives spread rumors that the ACLU ghostwrote his open
letter, a rumor that insults his intellectual ability to speak on his own personal experiences.174
Community groups recognize that while Mill himself is formerly incarcerated, the class
privilege of many at the helm of REFORM blinds the organization to the needs of most formerly
incarcerated people. Although REFORM was launched amidst a conversation on Mill’s
excessively long sentence, Jones identifies how the organization quickly retreated from measures
like sentence caps that would have helped Mill be released earlier. Instead, it has praised
measures that would have had no effect, or even a negative effect, on a similar situation to
Mill’s.175 While REFORM’s influence allows “do-gooder billionaires who want to put a
thumbprint on criminal justice” to court celebrities and elected officials, it has not gained the
trust of the community.176 Ultimately, community organizers suggest that REFORM utilizes
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epistemic power to exclude the voices of formerly incarcerated, directly impacted
Pennsylvanians.
REFORM’s positioning as a national organization is also key to its actions in relation to
local community organizers. Randol finds REFORM to represent a trend of national
organizations “parachuting” in with little understanding of the convoluted criminal legal system
in Pennsylvania and assuming they can deal with the situation better than people on the
ground.177 Even if not a malicious or intentional philosophy, the complicated, localized nature of
probation means that unfamiliar organizations or legislators may easily think certain harmful
reforms are actually a step forward. Smith rejects this characterization, saying that REFORM
knows activists have been working on criminal justice issues in any state long before it arrives,
and that the organization does not want to appear like “the large entity that is here to usurp all the
oxygen out of the room.”178 Regardless, REFORM certainly benefits from its delocalized, elite,
and young status. Smith says that being unknown on the political scene is positive in some ways
because it has not yet “rubbed enough people in the wrong way” in a way local and state
advocacy groups with established histories of activism may have.179 Thus, REFORM is further
able to implicitly dominate political conversation.
In many ways, the REFORM Alliance has commendable goals, and its advocates
sincerely wish to change the criminal legal system. Nonetheless, its emphasis on bipartisanship
at all costs has resulted in alliances that re-amplify carcerality. In attempting to link together the
politics of formerly incarcerated people and billionaire Trump supporters, it disguises harmful
changes under the banner of “reform.” REFORM has used its influence stemming from national
celebrity and elite power in service of neoliberal reformist reforms, hindering local activists
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working for anti-carceral change in Pennsylvania. Its monopoly on the political landscape has
hurt efforts to reduce the use of probation.

Chapter 3: The Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association
The Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association (PDAA) is perhaps the most explicit
roadblock which obstructs probation reform in Pennsylvania. The PDAA is a statewide
prosecutors association designed to support Pennsylvania’s 67 District Attorneys, and it
functions as both a trade association and lobbying group.180 A highly organized operation, the
PDAA benefits from an assumption of ideological uniformity among DAs and maintains
unequaled institutionalized power in the legislative branch. It is extremely effective in shaping
the outcome of all types of criminal legal legislation. The PDAA consistently opposes reform
measures and lobbies almost entirely for bills which increase criminalization and sentencing;
reform it does support is justified using cost-efficiency frameworks while reaffirming the need
for punishment. An explanation for why Pennsylvania’s probation system remains
extraordinarily punitive and has resisted reform must, therefore, take into account the actions of
the PDAA.
Nationwide, statewide prosecutors associations matter far more than the attention they are
typically given in campaigns for reform. Prosecutors have near-total control over the legal
system due to their wide latitude in deciding the specifics of charging and plea bargaining – 96%
of all cases in Pennsylvania result in plea deals.181 Accordingly, scholars identify prosecutors as
the most important driver of prison population increases.182 As nonprofit, professional
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organizations, prosecutors associations engage in lobbying, training, and public education
efforts; they typically consist of dues-paying lead prosecutors from each state district or
county.183 An investigation by journalist Jessica Pishko found that as influential political actors
made up of members with incredible individual power, district attorneys associations “do not just
‘enforce’ the law; in fact, they help to make it.”184 Specifically, they nearly always advocate for
tough-on-crime legislation to create new offenses, increase penalties, and provide more
discretion to prosecutors while opposing legislation to decriminalize certain actions, reduce
sentences, or protect defendants.185 Across states, district attorneys associations routinely and
successfully block even bipartisan criminal legal reforms supported by wide swathes of the
public.186 Their active influence is thus especially potent.
Writ large, most district attorneys associations share similar goals – disseminating
resources among the state’s prosecutors, coordinating between prosecutors and state officials,
advocating for the interests of their prosecutors, establishing prosecutorial standards, and
providing training.187 Indeed, the Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association lists its goals as
assisting prosecutors in executing their duties and pursuing justice, championing the PDAA’s
views to the government and public, and working with other agencies on “matters of mutual
concern.”188 State district attorneys associations are endowed with tremendous amounts of
influence. They tend to sit on a vast number of state advisory boards, committees, and councils
dealing with all aspects of crime (prevention, investigation, charging, sentencing, policy) in
addition to those only tangentially related to crime.189 They are especially vigorous state and
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federal lobbyists, pushing for a more punitive criminal legal system.190 As their members are
elected officials themselves, district attorneys associations often exert influence over other
elections by lending or withholding support for candidates; they also file amicus briefs and lead
public campaigns in line with their ideological goals.191 Despite the notion of the judiciary as
neutral, district attorneys associations demonstrate the trend of prosecutors holding extensive
control over not just the judicial branch, but the executive and legislative branch as well.

The Power of the PDAA
Although every state has a prosecutors association, Pennsylvania’s is especially notable.
Founded in 1912, the PDAA is the second oldest association of its kind in America. 192 Through
annual meetings, regular trainings, resource dissemination, and publications, it is one of the most
active prosecutors associations in the country.193 With a current membership of 66 out of the 67
DAs in the state, the PDAA is led by an Executive Director and a 12-member executive
committee; it also includes three sub-committees, all populated by DAs.194
The PDAA has a long history of supporting punitive criminal justice measures and
opposing reform. Randol strikingly states that “the single largest obstacle to getting anything
meaningfully reformed in Pennsylvania as it pertains to the criminal legal system is the District
Attorneys Association.” 195 In a presentation by the PA Justice Alliance, a statewide grassroots
coalition of formerly incarcerated people, community members, and anti-carceral activists, she
listed some of the PDAA’s “Greatest Fails,” including:
190

Ibid, 97-103.
Ibid, 104-110.
192
“PDAA History.”
193
Yeargain, “Prosecutorial Disassociation,” 90.
194
Chris Palmer, “Philly DA Larry Krasner Withdraws Office from Statewide Prosecutors Group,” The Philadelphia Inquirer, November 16,
2018, accessed March 17, 2022,
https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/crime/philadelphia-da-district-attorney-larry-krasner-withdraws-pdaa-20181116.html; Pennsylvania Justice
Alliance and Elizabeth Randol, “Who Keeps People In Prison,” 41:15 - 41:57.
195
Randol, interview.
191

49

● Shutting down measures to consider defendants’ mental health in death penalty cases.
● Claiming that “there are no innocent people in prison in Pennsylvania.”
● Advocating for reinstating mandatory minimum sentences.
● Opposing civil asset forfeiture reform by calling it a “Drug Dealer’s Bill of Rights.”
● Blocking immunity for child sex trafficking survivors, arguing that they would be safer in
the criminal legal system.196

A Pennsylvania grassroots organization, the Coalition to Abolish Death by Incarceration, had its
efforts torpedoed by the PDAA in 2018. A bill providing parole eligibility for those serving life
sentences was on the verge of successfully passing through the Senate Judiciary Committee, the
first time a bill of its kind had advanced so far. Two days before the vote, the PDAA began an
antagonistic campaign against two committee members, prompting them to withdraw support.
According to Abolitionist Law Center’s Executive Director Robert Saleem Holbrook, this
campaign set back the coalition’s fight by years.197
These anecdotes reflect the PDAA’s immense effectiveness in blocking reform. From
2015 to 2018, the PDAA only lobbied on 8% of criminal legal bills introduced. When the PDAA
supported a bill, its pass rate was 52.6%, and when the PDAA opposed a bill, its pass rate was
0%.198 In fact, it is customary for the Senate or House Judiciary Committee to not even list a bill
for a vote if it is opposed by the PDAA.199 Mark Bergstrom, Executive Director of the
Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing, affirms that the PDAA is especially influential in the
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House of Representatives and the Judiciary Committee.200 Its members are “always active” and
whenever the Sentencing Commission holds public hearings, “they are going to have a position
and we are going to know what it is.”201
The PDAA holds institutionalized power in the legislature in a way which differentiates it
from its adversaries. Unlike prosecutors, public defenders lack the funding and resources to
handle their skyrocketing caseloads, let alone lobby.202 Defenders lack a state office to unify
divergent interests and advocate for their positions; defenders also represent individuals who are
indigent, unlike DAs, who represent jurisdictions as elected officials.203 No serious lobby exists
for those who have experienced incarceration or who wish to make the legal system less
punitive. As probation reform has become more salient, the dynamics of interest group influence
in Pennsylvania remain an uneven playing field in which the PDAA holds the upper hand.
The PDAA exerts compelling influence over both Pennsylvania Democrats and
Republicans for several reasons.204 Legislators tend to be amenable to the PDAA’s perspective
because of the importance of maintaining working relationships with their local DA for the
purposes of constituent services.205 As politically powerful actors, DAs criticizing certain
legislators as soft-on-crime can harm a legislator in their next election.206 Thus, the PDAA
benefits from a preexisting tough-on-crime political culture in which the safest bet for legislators
is to not aggravate the PDAA.207
In addition, given the convoluted nature of criminal law and the county probation system,
the PDAA is often treated as a neutral source of legal wisdom, without acknowledgement of its
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vested interest in pro-prosecutor and pro-carceral ideologies.208 Randol notes that the onus is
generally placed on reformers to amass significant amounts of data to justify their positions,
whereas PDAA lobbyists are taken at face value. 209 Hence, the PDAA is invited to offer feedback
on every step of the criminal legal policy process, even if the topics at hand are wholly separate
from its members’ responsibilities as prosecutors. Though Pennsylvania prosecutors are
minimally involved with the administration of probation, they consistently weighed in on recent
probation reform bills.210
Consequently, the PDAA has considerably shaped the direction of probation reform in
Pennsylvania, blocking measures to shrink the state’s probationary footprint, watering down
legislation, and adding in more punitive elements. At the Senate Judiciary Committee’s public
hearing to consider SB 14, Greg Rowe (PDAA’s then-director of legislation), Fran Chardo
(Dauphin County DA), and Stefanie Salavantis (Luzerne County DA) testified on behalf of the
PDAA. Rooting its testimony in the belief that probation is fundamentally an important,
functioning form of punishment used to deter crime, rehabilitate, and mandate compliance with
treatment, the PDAA asserted, contrary to statewide data, that stories of probationers having long
sentences or being revoked for minor violations were outliers.211
Furthermore, the PDAA opposed banning consecutive (stacked) and split sentencing on
the basis of not forgetting about different victims if multiple offenses occurred and maintaining
judges’ flexibility to decide the length and terms of supervision. 212 It also insisted against caps on
probation sentences, which were then still included in the bill.213 Arguing that Pennsylvania
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already has caps – that of the statutory maximum – the PDAA warned that caps would prevent
longer supervision of “criminogenic” offenders, and weaken probation so much that judges may
instead resort to incarceration for those they would normally place on probation (an argument
some see as a veiled threat).214 Finally, the PDAA suggested three pivotal measures in addition to
scrapping restrictions on long sentences: mandatory periodic probationary status review
conferences every three years, earned time credits, and graduated sanctions.215
At first, some legislators pushed back against the PDAA’s testimony. One Democratic
senator commented that “your tone is that the system just needs some ‘tweaking’ to get back on
track…I can’t agree there.”216 Senator Williams, SB-14’s prime sponsor, interrogated DA
Chardo’s lack of data and emphasized the staggering degree to which probation in Pennsylvania
is out of step with other states.217 Regardless, by the time the bill emerged out of the Judiciary
five days later, SB 14 had been drastically amended. With all mention of sentence caps or bans
on stacked and split sentencing eliminated, SB 14 now added new ways to incarcerate revoked
probationers, and included a system of probation review conferences nearly identical to what the
PDAA described. 218 A year later, SB 913 was supported by the PDAA and was largely similar to
the amended version of SB 14. Ultimately, the PDAA’s testimony and its visible impact on bill
content demonstrates its ability to dictate and dilute legislation.

The Slow Fragmentation of Prosecutorial Politics
The PDAA can also smoothly obstruct reform because it intentionally acts as the voice of
all DAs in the state, shutting out the opinions of prosecutors who may be more reform-minded
214
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on certain issues. Legislators, journalists, and others assume that the PDAA’s stance uniformly
reflects that of all prosecutors in the state, making the organization more authoritative and its
advocacy “annoyingly effective”, despite individual differences in prosecutors’ beliefs. 219 In
reality, the policy positions of the PDAA are decided by its 12-member executive committee, and
only DAs who attend the PDAA’s two yearly conferences are invited to offer input to the
committee.220 This was an important reason Philadelphia DA Larry Krasner, one of the most
famous “progressive prosecutors” in the country, gave for withdrawing his office from the
PDAA in 2018. He asserted that the PDAA was “claiming that Philadelphia supports this
absolute nonsense…and we do not…The [PDAA] will not claim legitimacy of its most important
criminal justice jurisdiction.”221
Krasner’s exit revealed the fragmenting politics of prosecution, and the challenges DAs
sympathetic to reform may face within the PDAA. Afterwards, the PDAA and its members
denigrated Krasner, calling him “divisive” and Philadelphia a county riddled with “blight” liable
to spread.222 The Pennsylvania government, too, acted combatively. A bill was passed which only
targeted Philadelphia during the length of Krasner’s first term, allowing the state attorney general
to prosecute firearms offenses his office did not prosecute; judges including those in the state
Supreme Court were conspicuously opposed to Krasner’s sentencing practices.223
Since its departure from the PDAA, the Philadelphia DA’s office has been less willing to
advocate for more progressive changes in state policy. Dana Bazelon, Senior Policy Advisor to
DA Krasner, says that Krasner withdrew from the association with hopes of setting up an
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independent progressive prosecutor’s lobby in the future.224 With no other DAs in the state
having joined his ranks as of yet, his office has chosen to mostly abstain from Harrisburg
politics, considering it an unwise use of resources.225 Although Krasner’s office opposed SB 14,
Bazelon recounts that this decision angered even its regular allies, and the office has not publicly
commented on SB 913.226 Given the vitriol directed towards Philadelphia from the rest of the
state, Bazelon contextualizes her office’s inaction, noting that “...our meddling in anything that's
going on in Harrisburg could have unseen negative consequences, because Larry has become…a
figure of controversy.”227 Indeed, she emphasizes that Krasner outwardly supporting a bill would
be the easiest way to make it fail.228 The withdrawal of Krasner’s office from state politics due to
the intractable position of progressive prosecutors reflects how the PDAA has easily been able to
dominate the political landscape and command state-level discussions on probation reform.
Here, it is critical to note scholarship criticizing the “progressive prosecutor”
phenomenon. Many write that even well-intentioned prosecutors, embedded in an institution
with a structural interest in punishing more people in harsher ways, cannot eliminate mass
incarceration.229 Krasner’s silence reflects these impossibilities surrounding progressive
prosecutorial activism. Nevertheless, the intense pushback towards Krasner points to how the
PDAA’s power derives from its assumed ideological consistency. Deconstructing that myth may
weaken the PDAA’s authority.
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The PDAA and the Deceptive Promise of Reform
The PDAA’s punitive actions on probation in Pennsylvania are often obscured by its
supposed desire for “smart, balanced” reforms.230 The association’s public statements on
probation reform acknowledge critiques of probation as too long, too harsh, and prompting too
much incarceration after revocation; as such, it claims to seek a “better probation system.”231
Like in the Senate Judiciary hearing, the PDAA consistently qualifies support of reform with the
overarching principle that probation is a fundamentally important, well-functioning tool which
strengthens communities, and that certain flawed practices do not represent institutional
failure.232 After Meek Mill’s case drew attention, the PDAA attempted to exceptionalize his
situation, releasing a statement saying that it could not “let one individual under very unique
circumstances indict an entire system.”233 As the PDAA encourages reform, it bifurcates
probationers in the same breath, reaffirming punitive measures towards those who “remain
dangerous, are in continued need of treatment, have not paid all of their restitution, or…violate
the terms of their probation.”234 This renders reform ineffectual and disavows systemic change.
In general, the PDAA advocates for reform only on the basis that the probation system
needs to be more “balanced,” “streamlined,” or “efficient.”235 Rarely does it identify the problem
with probation as an ethical one as opposed to one concerned with resource allocation. This is an
argument consistently made by so-called punishment bureaucrats, arbiters of the carceral state
who claim to advance reform, enacting the barest of changes needed to uphold the current
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system’s legitimacy and maintain the US as the “greatest incarcerator in the world.”236 An
analysis of prosecutors across the country finds that when prosecutors have supported reform,
they have done so not because the current system of mass caging and supervision is “unfair or
inequitable,” but because they hoped reform would result in a system that is “less costly and
more efficient.”237 As legal scholar Michelle Alexander claims, this practice of “tinkering” at the
margins of the carceral state – adding review conferences, rewording a few probation restrictions
– leave its foundational ideologies untouched.238 The PDAA and scores of state and national
actors perpetuate carcerality while supporting reform via this framework. Ultimately, they inhibit
future anti-carceral reforms that are rooted in the understanding that mass supervision in
Pennsylvania is intrinsically unconscionable.
Pennsylvanians are increasingly growing aware of the PDAA’s shrouded role in lobbying
against criminal legal reform. The PDAA, one of the strongest associations of its kind, has
consistently distorted probation bills and choked off possibilities for non-reformist
transformational change that would require mass probation termination and significantly less
punitiveness. Its institutional power is derived not from aggression, but the political influence of
DAs, an assumption of broad expertise and neutrality, a climate amenable to tough-on-crime
beliefs which treat the PDAA’s beliefs as reasonable, and a perception of internal ideological
consistency. Kris Henderson, executive director of the Amistad Law Project, observes that
“power often accumulates…because we’re unable to name it…Those in power want to act as if
they’re not, and [that] they’re just expressing the common sense of the entire society.”239 As
such, the PDAA refrains from explicitly claiming that they are in charge, instead couching its
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statements in the argument that its stances represent a common-sense consensus. As long as
prosecutors – even progressive prosecutors – maintain singular control over the criminal legal
system, it may be impossible to erase the influence of the PDAA on probation. However,
exposing the PDAA’s influence on legislators and splintering off DAs who do not unilaterally
agree with the PDAA’s positions may begin to loosen its suffocating hold on the probation
reform conversation.

Conclusion
Examining the struggle to achieve probation reform in Pennsylvania which moves the
state towards decarceration reveals three key institutional roadblocks. Firstly, extreme political
devolution in the probation system results in overburdened county departments in permanent
crisis. This distracts mainstream calls for reform away from broad, state-level changes reducing
the size of the probation system to reforms which merely increase funding to probation
departments so that they can more easily carry out the same tasks. More research is needed into
this process to show how explicit this change in institutional priorities has been in Pennsylvania
beyond the example of justice reinvestment. Devolution also expands the number of stakeholders
enmeshed in the probation system and entrenches the status quo, while complicating the efforts
of activists by dispersing responsibility for excessive supervision among 65 counties.
The next roadblock is REFORM Alliance, a key non-governmental actor that has utilized
elite power to gain both legislative and sociocultural influence, endorsing bills which disguise
themselves as positive reforms while actually worsening probation. As a national nonprofit,
REFORM’s strategy of accommodating conservative policies in bills like HB 1555, SB 14, and
SB 913 has marginalized formerly incarcerated activists and reflected a phenomenon of
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neoliberal celebrity activism. Though REFORM is an organization which operates in multiple
states, and though other national nonprofits have also influenced probation reform in
Pennsylvania to some degree in recent years, REFORM’s roots in Pennsylvania due to the Meek
Mill case, its deep engagement in the state, and lack of previous scholarly study make it a crucial
piece of this argument.
Finally, the Pennsylvania District Attorney’s Association is one of the most direct barriers
to change. A tough-on-crime association with massive sway in the legislature, the PDAA was
responsible for removing progressive elements from probation reform bills and attaching
measures to increase their punitiveness. Reforms it does support reaffirm the legitimacy of the
carceral system. The PDAA benefits from an assumption of ideological uniformity and, as DA
Krasner’s withdrawal from state politics demonstrates, progressive prosecutors can do little to
erode its power.
A belief in the legitimacy of probation and community supervision is deeply ingrained
into Pennsylvania institutions. The state’s abnormally high incarceration rates rightfully attract
ire. However, as the attention of criminal legal reform discourse centers largely on those who are
physically incarcerated inside prisons and jails, a web of correctional control continues to quietly
escape the cell and ensnare a staggeringly large number of Pennsylvanians outside. Bills which
attempt to deal with mass supervision in Pennsylvania are being proposed. Still, legislators and
advocates must take caution, for pro-carceral measures which increase the size and intensity of
the criminal legal system are often branded as reforms despite strengthening the very forces they
claim to want to end.
Although this investigation focuses on institutions specific to Pennsylvania, many of the
circumstances highlighted – decentralization, the influence of national advocacy organizations,
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and prosecutors’ lobbies – are present in many states. Furthermore, a process of analyzing
structural barriers is still applicable and salient even if the specific institutional mechanisms
differ across states. Pennsylvania’s recent experiences with failed probation reform highlight the
pitfalls states may continue to face on the road to ending mass correctional control. As more
grow aware of the need for decarceration and abolitionist change, identifying such pitfalls
beforehand can convince people of the need to transform current reform discourse and strategies.
The epidemic of community supervision in Pennsylvania is a symptom of the larger
carceral crisis in the state and across the nation. The full extent of this crisis is often concealed,
because “reform” is a word that groups across the political spectrum seem to enthusiastically
support. Too often, “reform” tweaks an already-broken system whose fundamental problem is
that it amplifies existing societal hierarchies based on incorrect assumptions about what “crime”
is and what causes it. Such reform does nothing more than reinscribe that system. Challenging
community supervision in Pennsylvania is therefore a necessary step towards dismantling the
carceral state and the ideologies it rests upon.
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A. List of Interviewees
NAME

POSITION

April Billet-Barclay

President, Pennsylvania County Chief Adult
Probation and Parole Officers Association; Director,
York County Probation Services

Britton Smith

Senior Organizing Strategist, REFORM Alliance

Dana Bazelon

Senior Policy Advisor, Philadelphia District
Attorney’s Office

Dolly Prabhu

Staff Attorney, Abolitionist Law Center

Elizabeth Randol

Legislative Director, ACLU of Pennsylvania

Helene Placey

Executive Director, Pennsylvania County Chief Adult
Probation and Parole Officers Association

Jordan Harris

State Representative (D), 186th Legislative District in
Philadelphia

Mark Bergstrom

Executive Director, Pennsylvania Commission on
Sentencing

Reuben Jones

Executive Director, Frontline Dads

Sheryl Delozier

State Representative (R), 88th Legislative District in
Cumberland County

* All interviews were conducted over Zoom or telephone.

B. Recent Probation Reform Bills
SESSION
2019-20

BILL

DESCRIPTION

HB 1555 Heavily amended – eliminates some
location restrictions for those on
probation and prohibits judges from
using incarceration to “vindicate the

RESPONSE
The ACLU, Philadelphia
District Attorney Larry
Krasner, and other
grassroots groups

STATUS
Passed the
Judiciary
committee,
removed
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authority of the court.” Amended bill
scrapped probation term caps,
restrictions on punitive sentencing
restrictions, due process protections,
and time-off credits. Changes law to
recommend incarceration for certain
offenses and establishes mandatory
probation reviews where none existed
previously.240

opposed.241 CEO of
REFORM Alliance Van
Jones supported, as well as
a variety of self-described
centrist, liberal, or
conservative advocacy
organizations.242

from
table.243

2019-20

SB 14

Heavily amended – final version offers
time-off credits for good behavior in
probation, prohibits judges from using
incarceration to “vindicate the authority
of the court,” and prohibits tying
probation conditions to failure to pay
court fees. Amended bill scrapped
probation term caps and automatic
removals from probation, added
mandatory probation reviews where
none existed previously, increased
length of incarceration for technical
violations, and allowed judges to
maintain probation indefinitely via
loopholes if restitution cannot be
paid.244

Passed the Senate
unanimously with support
of REFORM Alliance, the
ACLU and other
grassroots groups
opposed.245

Passed the
Senate
unanimously
, referred to
Judiciary
and died in
the House.246

2021-22

SB 5

Caps probation terms, prohibits stacked
sentencing and extending probation due
to fine nonpayment, instructs court on
caps to reimprisonment for revocation
or alternatives to incarceration, and

Families for Justice
Reform supports, many
other advocacy groups
have not yet taken a
position.248

Pending in
the Judiciary
since
3/19/21. 249

240

ACLU Pennsylvania, “HB 1555 Analysis.”
ACLU Pennsylvania, “HB 1555 Analysis”; Larry Krasner, “Philly DA Krasner: Gutted Pa. House Probation Bill Is Unconstitutional and
Harmful | Opinion,” Pennsylvania Capital-Star, December 15, 2019, accessed December 15, 2021,
https://www.penncapital-star.com/commentary/philly-da-krasner-gutted-pa-house-probation-bill-is-unconstitutional-and-harmful-opinion/.
242
Van Jones and Holly Harris, “Pennsylvania Should Seize Chance for Probation Reform,” Lancaster Online, February 16, 2020, accessed
December 15, 2021,
https://lancasteronline.com/opinion/columnists/pennsylvania-should-seize-chance-for-probation-reform/article_91d36c68-4f44-11ea-8c1c-6745b
36d95c7.html; John N Mitchell, “Pa. House Bill Introduced Aimed at Fixing Parole, Probation,” The Philadelphia Tribune, May 30, 2019,
accessed December 15, 2021,
https://www.phillytrib.com/news/local_news/pa-house-bill-introduced-aimed-at-fixing-parole-probation/article_3dc4a515-c823-54b0-aeb7-dae9a
9723013.html.
243
“Bill Information - House Bill 1555, Regular Session 2019-2020,” Pennsylvania General Assembly, accessed December 17, 2021,
https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billinfo/billinfo.cfm?syear=2019&sind=0&body=H&type=B&bn=1555.
244
Randol, “OPPOSITION TO SB 14 PN 1834.”
245
Southwick, “Pa. Senate Unanimously Passes Bill to REFORM Probation System.”; Ben-Menachem, “How Legislation Meant to Overhaul
Probation and Parole in Pennsylvania Strayed from Its Roots.”
246
“Pennsylvania Senate Bill 14: 2019-2020,” LegiScan (LegiScan), accessed December 17, 2021, https://legiscan.com/PA/sponsors/SB14/2019.
248
Families for Justice Reform, “Bill Summary: Probation Reform in Pennsylvania SB 5.”
249
“Pennsylvania Senate Bill 5: 2021-2022,” LegiScan (LegiScan), accessed December 17, 2021, https://legiscan.com/PA/bill/SB5/2021.
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requires early probation termination in
some cases.247
2021-22

247

SB 913

Based on SB 14 – eliminates some
travel restrictions for those on
probation, establishes time-off credits.
Changes law to recommend
incarceration for certain offenses,
creates new mandatory probation
review conferences. Does not reduce
length of probation sentences or
stacked / split sentencing practices.250

The ACLU and other
grassroots, advocacy, and
legal organizations
released a joint statement
in opposition; REFORM
Alliance and the
Pennsylvania Safety
Coalition were in
support.251

Passed the
Senate on
12/15/21.252

“Bill Summary: Probation Reform in Pennsylvania SB 5,” Families for Justice Reform (Families for Justice Reform), accessed December 17,
2021, https://famm.org/wp-content/uploads/SB-5-Bill-Summary-2021.pdf.
250
ACLU Pennsylvania, “Opposition to Senate Bill 913.”
251
ACLU Pennsylvania, “Opposition to Senate Bill 913”; Rubin, “Pennsylvania’s Probation System Needs Reform.”
252
“Bill Information: Senate Bill 913, Regular Session 2021-2022,” Pennsylvania General Assembly, accessed December 17, 2021,
https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billInfo/billInfo.cfm?sYear=2021&sInd=0&body=S&type=B&bn=0913.

63
Bibliography
“91 Percent of Americans Support Criminal Justice Reform, ACLU Polling Finds.” American
Civil Liberties Union. American Civil Liberties Union, November 16, 2017. Accessed
December 14, 2021.
https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/91-percent-americans-support-criminal-justice-refor
m-aclu-polling-finds.
“About.” Pennsylvania Safety Coalition. Accessed March 23, 2022.
https://www.pasafetycoalition.com/about.
ACLU. Rep. Blueprint for Smart Justice: Pennsylvania. American Civil Liberties Union, 2018.
“ACLU-PA Statement on State Senate Passage of Probation-Related Legislation.” ACLU
Pennsylvania. ACLU Pennsylvania, July 15, 2020. Accessed October 24, 2021. ACLU
Pennsylvania.
https://aclupa.org/en/press-releases/aclu-pa-statement-state-senate-passage-probation-rel
ated-legislation.
Archer, Alfred, Amanda Cawston, Benjamin Matheson, and Machteld Geuskens. “Celebrity,
Democracy, and Epistemic Power.” Perspectives on Politics 18, no. 1 (March 17, 2020):
27–42. https://doi.org/doi:10.1017/S1537592719002615.
Austin, James, Eric Cadora, Todd R. Clear, Kara Dansky, Judith Greene, Vanita Gupta, Marc
Mauer, Nicole Porter, Susan Tucker, and Malcolm C. Young. "Ending Mass
Incarceration Charting a New Justice Reinvestment." (2013).
https://www.proquest.com/ncjrs/docview/1426991614/40D090F0165E4239PQ/1.
Barkan, Ross. “Exterminating Angels: The American Myth of the Progressive Prosecutor.” The
Baffler, 46. July/August 2019.
https://thebaffler.com/outbursts/exterminating-angels-barkan.
Barker, Vanessa. The Politics of Imprisonment: How the Democratic Process Shapes the Way
America Punishes Offenders. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
Barkow, Rachel. “Can Prosecutors End Mass Incarceration?” Michigan Law Review 119, no. 6
(April 2021): 1365–98. https://doi.org/10.36644/mlr.119.6.can.
Bazelon, Dana, interview by Srinidhi Ramakrishna, March 16, 2022.
Beach, Derek. “Process-Tracing Methods in Social Science.” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of
Politics, January 25, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.176.
Beckett, Katherine, Anna Reosti, and Emily Knaphus. “The End of an Era? Understanding the
Contradictions of Criminal Justice Reform.” The Annals of the American Academy of

64
Political and Social Science 664, no. 1 (2016): 238–59.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716215598973.
Ben-Menachem, Jonathan. “How Legislation Meant to Overhaul Probation and Parole in
Pennsylvania Strayed from Its Roots.” The Appeal. September 16, 2020. Accessed
October 20, 2021. https://theappeal.org/probation-pennsylvania/.
Ben-Moshe, Liat. "The Tension between Abolition and Reform." In The End of Prisons :
Reflections from the Decarceration Movement, edited by Nagel, Mechthild E. and
Anthony Nocella II J., 83-92. Amsterdam, Netherlands: Editions Rodopi B.V., 2013.
Bergstrom, Mark, interview by Srinidhi Ramakrishna, January 21, 2022.
Bertram, Wanda. “New Report Ranks States on ‘Correctional Control,’ Showing Huge State
Disparities in Use of Probation.” Prison Policy Initiative. Prison Policy Initiative,
December 11, 2018. Accessed March 2, 2022.
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2018/12/11/correctional-control/.
Billet-Barclay, April, interview by Srinidhi Ramakrishna, January 31, 2022.
Billet-Barclay, April. “Public Hearing on Justice Reinvestment II (Senate Bills 500, 501, 502) .”
County Chief Adult Probation and Parole Officers Association of Pennsylvania, June 17,
2019. Accessed March 2, 2022.
https://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/TR/Transcripts/2019_0077_0002_TSTMNY.pdf.
Billet-Barclay, April. “The Pa. Legislature Must Do Better on Probation Reform next Session |
Opinion.” Pennsylvania Capital-Star, October 25, 2020. Accessed March 2, 2022.
https://www.penncapital-star.com/criminal-justice/the-pa-legislature-must-do-better-on-p
robation-reform-next-session-opinion/.
“Bill Information: House Bill 1555, Regular Session 2019-2020.” Pennsylvania General
Assembly. Accessed December 17, 2021.
https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billinfo/billinfo.cfm?syear=2019&sind=0&body=H
&type=B&bn=1555.
“Bill Information: Senate Bill 913, Regular Session 2021-2022.” Pennsylvania General
Assembly. Accessed December 17, 2021.
https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billInfo/billInfo.cfm?sYear=2021&sInd=0&body=S
&type=B&bn=0913.
“Bill Summary: Probation Reform in Pennsylvania SB 5.” Families for Justice Reform. Families
for Justice Reform. Accessed December 17, 2021.
https://famm.org/wp-content/uploads/SB-5-Bill-Summary-2021.pdf.

65

Briffault, Richard. “Our Localism: Part II - Localism and Legal Theory.” Columbia Law Review
90, no. 2 (1990): 447. https://doi.org/10.2307/1122776.
Buchanan, Larry, Quoctrung Bui, and Jugal K. Patel. “Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest
Movement in U.S. History.” The New York Times. July 3, 2020. Accessed December 14,
2021.
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.ht
ml.
Campbell, Michael C. "Politics, Prisons, and Law Enforcement: An Examination of the
Emergence of ‘Law and Order’ Politics in Texas." Law & Society Review 45, no. 3
(September 1, 2011): 631-665. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5893.2011.00446.x.
Cate, Sarah. “The Politics of Prison Reform: Juvenile Justice Policy in Texas, California and
Pennsylvania.” Dissertation, Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations, 2016.
Cassidy, R. Michael. “(Ad)Ministering Justice: A Prosecutor's Ethical Duty to Support
Sentencing Reform.” Boston College Law School Faculty Papers, 2014, 981–1025.
https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1723&context=lsfp.
Chardo, Fran, Stephanie Salavantis, and Greg Rowe. “Hearing on County Probation Reform
Before the Senate Judiciary Committee: June 25, 2019,” June 25, 2019. Accessed
February 26, 2022.
https://judiciary.pasenategop.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/42/2019/06/Fran-Chardo-Ste
phanie-Salavantis-Greg-Rowe.pdf.
Childress, Sarah. “Michelle Alexander: ‘A System of Racial and Social Control.’” Frontline.
April 29, 2014. Accessed February 26, 2022.
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/michelle-alexander-a-system-of-racial-and-so
cial-control/.
Clark, Michael, Scott Walters, Ray Gingerich, and Melissa Meltzer. “Motivational Interviewing
for Probation Officers: Tipping the Balance Toward Change.” APA PsycInfo 70, no. 1
(2006): 38–44.
“Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Legislative Journal,” July 15, 2020. Accessed March 23,
2022. https://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/SJ/2020/0/Sj20200715.pdf.
“County Adult Probation and Parole Advisory Committee.” Pennsylvania Commission on
Crime and Delinquency. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Accessed March 2, 2022.
https://www.pccd.pa.gov/AboutUs/Pages/County-Adult-Probation-and-Parole-Advisory-

66
Committee.aspx.
Delozier, Sheryl, interview by Srinidhi Ramakrishna, February 24, 2022.
DePuy, LeRoy B. “The Walnut Street Prison: Pennsylvania's First Penitentiary.” Pennsylvania
History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies 18, no. 2 (April 1951): 130–44.
Duchneskie, John. “A Chronology of the Meek Mill Case.” The Philadelphia Inquirer. April 24,
2018. Accessed December 15, 2021.
https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/a-chronology-of-the-meek-mill-case-20180424.ht
ml.
“EBP Implementation.” County Chief Adult Probation and Parole Officers Association of
Pennsylvania. County Chief Adult Probation and Parole Officers Association of
Pennsylvania. Accessed March 18, 2022.
http://www.ccappoap.com/public/ebpimplementation/.
Engler, Mark, and Paul Engler. “André Gorz's Non-Reformist Reforms Show How We Can
Transform the World Today.” Jacobin, July 22, 2021. Accessed October 20, 2021.
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2021/07/andre-gorz-non-reformist-reforms-revolution-poli
tical-theory.
“Evidence-Based Practices Strategic Plan: Blueprint for EBP Implementation.” County Chief
Adult Probation and Parole Officers Association of Pennsylvania. County Chief Adult
Probation and Parole Officers Association of Pennsylvania, June 2019. Accessed March
2, 2022.
https://static-cdn.edit.site/users-files/191c64648f234b7be82bd1e65fd0f6c9/blueprintebpi
mplementation_-6-2019_.pdf?dl=1.

Farrell, Nathan. “Co-Opting the 'Losers': Bob Geldof and Neoliberal Activism after the
Financial Crisis.” Essay. In The Political Economy of Celebrity Activism. Abingdon,
Oxon: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2021.
Garland, David. The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001.
Gilmore, Ruth Wilson. “Abolition Geography and the Problem of Innocence.” Essay. In Futures
of Black Radicalism, edited by Gaye Theresa Johnson and Alex Lubin. Verso, 2017.
Gilmore, Ruth Wilson. Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing

67
California. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2007.
Gilmore, Ruth Wilson. “Organized Abandonment and Organized Violence: Devolution and the
Police.” The Humanities Institute at UCSC. Lecture, February 27, 2022.
Giorgis, Hannah. "The Revelations of Meek Mill’s Legal Limbo." The Atlantic, August 9, 2019.
Accessed October 20, 2021.
https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2019/08/free-meek-jay-z-and-trickine
ss-celebrity-activism/595768/.
Gottschalk, Marie. Caught: The Prison State and the Lockdown of American Politics. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016.
“Gov. Wolf Announces Pennsylvania Prison Population Reaches 20-Year Low.” Pennsylvania
Pressroom, October 7, 2021. Accessed October 20, 2021.
https://www.media.pa.gov/pages/corrections_details.aspx?newsid=522.
Gunter, Barrie. Celebrity Capital: Assessing the Value of Fame. New York: Bloomsbury, 2014.
Hacker, Jacob S. “Privatizing Risk without Privatizing the Welfare State: The Hidden Politics of
Social Policy Retrenchment in the United States.” American Political Science Review
98, no. 2 (June 21, 2004): 243–60. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055404001121.
Hardison, Elizabeth. “With Vote Looming Pa. Probation Officers Line up against Parts of House
Reform Bill.” Pennsylvania Capital-Star, January 22, 2020. Accessed March 2, 2022.
https://www.penncapital-star.com/criminal-justice/with-vote-looming-pa-probation-offic
ers-line-up-against-parts-of-house-reform-bill/.
Harris, Jordan, interview by Srinidhi Ramakrishna, February 10, 2022.
“HB 1555 Analysis: Filed vs. Amended.” ACLU Pennsylvania. ACLU Pennsylvania, 2019.
Accessed December 16, 2021.
https://www.aclupa.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/aclu-pa_analysis_hb_1555_fil
ed_v_amended_2019-12-10.pdf.
Holder, Sarah, Fola Akinnibi, and Christopher Cannon. “‘We Have Not Defunded Anything’:
Big Cities Boost Police Budgets.” Bloomberg CityLab, September 22, 2020. Accessed
December 14, 2021.
https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2020-city-budget-police-defunding/.
Human Rights Watch, and American Civil Liberties Union. Rep. Revoked: How Probation and
Parole Feed Mass Incarceration in the United States. Human Rights Watch, July 2020.
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/embargoed_hrw_aclu_revoked_p
arole_and_probation_report_002.pdf.

68
“Joint Statement | Opposition to Senate Bill 913 (PN 1144).” ACLU Pennsylvania. ACLU
Pennsylvania, November 8, 2021. Accessed December 15, 2021.
https://www.aclupa.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/joint_statement-opposition_to
_senate_bill_913_pn_1144.pdf.
Jones, Lorenzo, and Gabriel Sayegh. “Opinion: Grassroots Movements Are Needed to End
Mass Incarceration.” City Limits. December 13, 2019. Accessed March 1, 2022.
https://citylimits.org/2019/12/13/opinion-grassroots-movements-are-needed-to-end-mass-incarc
eration/.
Jones, Reuben, interview by Srinidhi Ramakrishna, February 23, 2022.
Jones, Reuben. “An Open Letter to Meek Mill: Pa. Needs Real Probation Reform | Opinion.”
Pennsylvania Capital-Star. Pennsylvania Capital-Star, January 27, 2022. Accessed
March 23, 2022.
https://www.penncapital-star.com/commentary/an-open-letter-to-meek-mill-pa-needs-rea
l-probation-reform-opinion/.
Jones, Rick. Rep. Funding of County Adult Probation Services. Legislative Budget and Finance
Committee, 2015.
Jones, Van, and Holly Harris. “Pennsylvania Should Seize Chance for Probation Reform.”
Lancaster Online, February 16, 2020. Accessed December 15, 2021.
https://lancasteronline.com/opinion/columnists/pennsylvania-should-seize-chance-for-pr
obation-reform/article_91d36c68-4f44-11ea-8c1c-6745b36d95c7.html.
“The Justice Reinvestment Initiative Helps Law Enforcement Keep Communities Safe.”
Council of State Governments Justice Center. CSG Justice Center, October 2019.
Accessed October 19, 2021.
https://csgjusticecenter.org/publications/the-justice-reinvestment-initiative-helps-law-enf
orcement/.
“Justice Reinvestment in Pennsylvania.” Council of State Governments Justice Center. CSG
Justice Center. Accessed October 19, 2021.
https://csgjusticecenter.org/projects/justice-reinvestment/past-states/pennsylvania/.
“Justice Reinvestment in Pennsylvania: First Presentation to the Pennsylvania Justice
Reinvestment Working Group.” Council of State Governments Justice Center. CSG
Justice Center, March 9, 2016. Accessed October 19, 2021.
https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/PA-Launch-Presentation.pdf.
Kaeble, Danielle. Rep. Probation and Parole in the United States, 2020. Bureau of Justice
Statistics, December 2021. NCJ 303102. https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppus20.pdf.

69
Karakatsanis, Alec. “The Punishment Bureaucracy: How to Think About ‘Criminal Justice
Reform.’” The Yale Law Journal 128 (March 28, 2019).
https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-punishment-bureaucracy.
Karakatsanis, Alec. Usual Cruelty: The Complicity of Lawyers in the Criminal Injustice System.
New York: The New Press, 2019.
Kettl, Donald F. “The Transformation of Governance: Globalization, Devolution, and the Role
of Government.” Public Administration Review 60, no. 6 (2000): 488–97.
https://doi.org/10.1111/0033-3352.00112.
Kimble, Julian. “Is Meek Mill’s Friendship With Trump Supporter Robert Kraft an Unholy
Alliance?” Pitchfork. February 13, 2019. Accessed March 23, 2022.
https://pitchfork.com/thepitch/is-meek-mills-friendship-with-trump-supporter-robert-kraf
t-an-unholy-alliance/.
King, Stephanie. “Meek Mill, Kevin Hart, and Michael Rubin Miss the Point with $15 Million
Scholarship Donation | Opinion.” The Philadelphia Inquirer. January 20, 2022.
Accessed March 23, 2022.
https://www.inquirer.com/opinion/commentary/meek-mill-kevin-hart-michael-rubin-phil
adelphia-schools-20220120.html.
Klingele, Cecelia. “The Promises and Perils of Evidence-Based Corrections.” Notre Dame Law
Review 91, no. 2 (February 2016): 537–84.
http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol91/iss2/2.
Lynch, Mona Pauline. Sunbelt Justice: Arizona and the Transformation of American
Punishment. Stanford, CA: Stanford Law Books, 2010.
Majic, Samantha, Daniel O’Neill, and Michael Bernhard. “Celebrity and Politics.” Perspectives
on Politics 18, no. 1 (March 17, 2020): 1–8.
https://doi.org/10.1017/s1537592719004602.
Mauer, Marc, and Nazgol Ghandnoosh. Rep. Fewer Prisoners, Less Crime: A Tale of Three
States. The Sentencing Project, July 13, 2014.
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Fewer-Prisoners-Less-C
rime-A-Tale-of-Three-States.pdf.
McSherry, Bernadette, and Ian R. Freckelton. Coercive Care: Rights, Law and Policy. London:
Routledge, 2015.
“Meet REFORM.” REFORM Alliance. REFORM Alliance, November 8, 2021. Accessed
December 14, 2021. https://reformalliance.com/meet-reform/.

70
“Meeting to Consider SB 14, SB 1158, SB 1204, HB 256, HB 1855, and HB 1984.”
Pennsylvania Senate Judiciary Committee. Senate of Pennsylvania, June 23, 2020.
https://judiciary.pasenategop.com/062420/.
Meyer, Katie. “Despite Controversial Amendments, Pa. House Passes Justice Reinvestment
Bills.” WHYY, December 19, 2019. Accessed October 19, 2021.
https://whyy.org/articles/despite-controversial-amendments-pa-house-passes-justice-rein
vestment-bills/.
Miller, Lisa L. “Interest Groups and Crime Politics at the State Level.” Essay. In The Perils of
Federalism: Race, Poverty, and the Politics of Crime Control. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2008.
“Mission.” Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association. Pennsylvania District Attorneys
Association, April 22, 2019. Accessed March 17, 2022. https://www.pdaa.org/mission/.
Mitchell, John N. “Pa. House Bill Introduced Aimed at Fixing Parole, Probation.” The
Philadelphia Tribune, May 30, 2019. Accessed December 15, 2021.
https://www.phillytrib.com/news/local_news/pa-house-bill-introduced-aimed-at-fixing-p
arole-probation/article_3dc4a515-c823-54b0-aeb7-dae9a9723013.html.
“New Poll Finds That Urban and Rural America Are Rethinking Mass Incarceration.” Vera
Institute of Justice. Vera, June 12, 2017. Accessed December 14, 2021.
https://www.vera.org/newsroom/new-poll-finds-that-urban-and-rural-america-are-rethink
ing-mass-incarceration.
Nichanian, Daniel. “D.A. Associations Should Own Up To The Splintering Politics Of
Prosecution.” The Appeal. February 14, 2020. Accessed March 17, 2022.
https://theappeal.org/politicalreport/district-attorney-associations-political-conflicts-cdaa
/.
Nichanian, Daniel. “Larry Krasner Quit Pennsylvania's DA Association. What Does Group
Stand For?” The Appeal. December 20, 2018. Accessed March 17, 2022.
https://theappeal.org/politicalreport/spotlight-pdaa/.
Niven, David. “Who Says Shut Up and Dribble? Race and the Response to Athletes’ Political
Activism.” Journal of African American Studies 25, no. 2 (June 5, 2021): 298–311.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12111-021-09534-6.
Oppel, Richard A. “These Prosecutors Promised Change. Their Power Is Being Stripped Away.”
The New York Times. December 2, 2019. Accessed February 26, 2022.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/25/us/prosecutors-criminal-justice.html.

71
Orso, Anna. “They Said His Name: How George Floyd Changed a City 1,100 Miles Away.” The
Philadelphia Inquirer, June 19, 2020. Accessed December 14, 2021.
https://www.inquirer.com/news/inq/george-floyd-philadelphia-protest-photos-20200607.
html.
“Our Work.” REFORM Alliance. REFORM Alliance, October 28, 2021. Accessed March 23,
2022. https://reformalliance.com/our-work/.
Page, Joshua. The Toughest Beat: Politics, Punishment, and the Prison Officers' Union in
California. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Palmer, Chris. “Philly DA Larry Krasner Withdraws Office from Statewide Prosecutors Group.”
The Philadelphia Inquirer. November 16, 2018. Accessed March 17, 2022.
https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/crime/philadelphia-da-district-attorney-larry-krasn
er-withdraws-pdaa-20181116.html.
Partzsch, Lena. “Powerful Individuals in a Globalized World.” Global Policy 8, no. 1
(September 9, 2016): 5–13. https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12367.
“PDAA History.” Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association. Pennsylvania District Attorneys
Association, May 7, 2019. Accessed March 17, 2022. https://www.pdaa.org/history/.
“PDAA Responds to Governor Wolf and Meek Mill Call for Criminal Justice Reforms.”
Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association. Pennsylvania District Attorneys
Association, May 3, 2018. Accessed March 2, 2022.
https://www.pdaa.org/pdaa-responds-to-governor-wolf-and-meek-mill-call-for-criminal-j
ustice-reforms/.
“PDAA Supports Meaningful Changes to Pennsylvania's Probation System.” Pennsylvania
District Attorneys Association. Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association, 2019.
Accessed March 2, 2022.
https://www.pdaa.org/blog/pdaa-supports-meaningful-changes-to-pennsylvanias-probati
on-system/.
Pennsylvania Justice Alliance. “Who Keeps People In Prison? Exposing the Lobby of Mass
Incarceration in Pennsylvania.” December 9, 2021. Accessed December 11, 2021.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dUYH8uomB6U.
“Pennsylvania Senate Bill 14: 2019-2020: Regular Session.” LegiScan. LegiScan. Accessed
December 17, 2021. https://legiscan.com/PA/sponsors/SB14/2019.
“Pennsylvania Senate Bill 5: 2021-2022: Regular Session.” LegiScan. LegiScan. Accessed

72
December 17, 2021. https://legiscan.com/PA/bill/SB5/2021.
Pfaff, John F. Locked in: The True Causes of Mass Incarceration and How to Achieve Real
Reform. New York: Basic Books, 2017.
Phelps, Michelle S., Rebecca Shlafer, Kelly Lyn Mitchell, Tyler Winkelman, and Latasha
Jennings. “Mass Probation and Health: Lessons Learned from an Interdisciplinary
Research Project.” Robina Institute of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice. University of
Minnesota, July 20, 2021. Accessed March 2, 2022.
https://robinainstitute.umn.edu/news-views/mass-probation-and-health-lessons-learned-i
nterdisciplinary-research-project.
Pishko, Jessica. “Prosecutors Are Banding Together to Prevent Criminal-Justice Reform.” The
Nation. October 18, 2017. Accessed March 17, 2022.
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/prosecutors-are-banding-together-to-prevent-c
riminal-justice-reform/.
Placey, Helene, interview by Srinidhi Ramakrishna, January 31, 2022.
Prabhu, Dolly, interview by Srinidhi Ramakrishna, February 1, 2022.
“Public Hearing to Consider Probation and Parole Reform (SB 14) – Part 1 of 2.” Pennsylvania
Senate Republicans. Senate of Pennsylvania, June 25, 2019.
https://www.pasenategop.com/blog/062519/.
Purnell, Derecka. “Jay-Z Has Crossed the Picket Line with His NFL Deal.” The Guardian.
August 19, 2019. Accessed March 23, 2022.
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/aug/19/sorry-jay-z-racial-justice-corp
orations-billionaires.
Quinn, Eithne. “Occupy Wall Street, Racial Neoliberalism, and New York's Hip-Hop Moguls.”
American Quarterly. Johns Hopkins University Press, May 11, 2016.
https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/occupy-wall-street-racialneoliberalism-and-new-yorks-hiphop-moguls(29a05f57-eaa0-4320-94b5-ea3b0089e274)
/export.html.
REFORM Alliance (@REFORM), “#REFORM is at @MIAFest today by Cause Village,”
Tweet, August 31, 2019, https://twitter.com/reform/status/1167892548083257345.
REFORM Alliance. “REFORM Alliance Takes First Major Legislative Action to Transform
Pennsylvania's Oppressive Probation & Parole System.” Cision PR Newswire. May 31,
2019. Accessed March 23, 2022.
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/reform-alliance-takes-first-major-legislative

73
-action-to-transform-pennsylvanias-oppressive-probation--parole-system-300859840.ht
ml.
Randol, Elizabeth, interview by Srinidhi Ramakrishna, January 27, 2022.
“Reformist Reforms vs. Abolitionist Steps to End Imprisonment.” Critical Resistance.
Community Resource Hub for Safety & Accountability, 2021. Accessed February 2,
2022.
https://communityresourcehub.org/resources/reformist-reforms-vs-abolitionist-steps-in-p
olicing/.
Rep. County Adult Probation and Parole Annual Statistical Report 2018. Pennsylvania Board of
Probation and Parole, 2018.
Rep. Funding of County Adult Probation Services: Conducted Pursuant to House Resolution
2014-69. Harrisburg: Pennsylvania General Assembly, 2015.
Rep. A New Sensibility: An Analysis of Public Opinion Research on Attitudes Towards Crime
and Criminal Justice Policy. The Opportunity Agenda, 2016.
Rep. Prosecutor Lobbying in the States, 2015-2018. University of North Carolina School of
Law Prosecutors and Politics Project, June 2021.
https://law.unc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Prosecutor-Lobbying-in-the-States-201
5-2018.pdf.
“Reuben Jones: Pennsylvania.” JustLeadershipUSA. JustLeadershipUSA. Accessed March 23,
2022. https://jlusa.org/leader/reuben-jones/.
Reynolds, Carl. “Probation in Pennsylvania: Statement of Carl Reynolds, Senior Legal & Policy
Advisor.” The Council of State Governments Justice Center. Accessed March 2, 2022.
https://judiciary.pasenategop.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/42/2019/06/carl-reynolds.pdf
.
Rosen, Charlotte. “The False Promise of Criminal Justice Reform.” The Nation, January 5,
2022. Accessed March 2, 2022.
https://www.thenation.com/article/culture/carceral-con-review/.
Rubin, Michael. “Pennsylvania’s Probation System Needs Reform, and the Senate Should Do It
Soon | Opinion.” Penn Live, December 8, 2021. Accessed December 15, 2021.
https://www.pennlive.com/opinion/2021/12/pennsylvania-probation-system-needs-refor
m-and-the-senate-can-do-it-this-week-opinion.html.

74

Saward, Michael. “Authorisation and Authenticity: Representation and the Unelected.” Journal
of Political Philosophy 17, no. 1 (January 19, 2009): 1–22.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9760.2008.00309.x.
Schiraldi, Vincent. Rep. The Pennsylvania Community Corrections Story. New York: Columbia
University, 2018.
Schoenfeld, Heather. "Mass Incarceration and the Paradox of Prison Conditions Litigation."
Law & Society Review 44, no. 3 (2010): 731-767. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40926316.
Schragger, Richard C. “The Limits of Localism.” Michigan Law Review 100, no. 2 (2001): 373.
https://doi.org/10.2307/1290541.
Seeds, Christopher. “Bifurcation Nation: American Penal Policy in Late Mass Incarceration.”
Punishment & Society 19, no. 5 (2016): 590–610.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1462474516673822.
“Senate Bill No. 14 (PN 1834).” The General Assembly of Pennsylvania, June 30, 2020.
Accessed February 26, 2022.
https://www.legis.state.pa.us/CFDOCS/Legis/PN/Public/btCheck.cfm?txtType=PDF&se
ssYr=2019&sessInd=0&billBody=S&billTyp=B&billNbr=0014&pn=1834.
Setaro, Shawn. “How JAY-Z and Meek Mill’s REFORM Alliance Plans to Improve the
Criminal Justice System.” Complex. February 15, 2019. Accessed March 23, 2022.
https://www.complex.com/music/2019/02/jay-z-meek-mill-reform-organization-criminal
-justice.
Simon, Jonathan. Governing through Crime: How the War on Crime Transformed American
Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
Smith, Britton, interview by Srinidhi Ramakrishna, February 16, 2022.
Soss, Joe, Richard C. Fording, and Sanford F. Schram. “The Color of Devolution: Race,
Federalism, and the Politics of Social Control.” American Journal of Political Science
52, no. 3 (July 2008): 536–53. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00328.x.
Southwick, Ron. “Pa. Lawmakers Push Again to Change Probation System, but Can They Get It
Done?” Penn Live, October 26, 2021.
https://www.pennlive.com/news/2021/10/pa-lawmakers-push-again-to-change-probation
-system-but-can-they-get-it-done.html.
Southwick, Ron. “Pa. Senate Unanimously Passes Bill to REFORM Probation System;

75
Supporters Call It A 'Milestone'.” Penn Live. July 15, 2020. Accessed October 20, 2021.
https://www.pennlive.com/news/2020/07/pa-senate-unanimously-passes-bill-to-reform-p
robation-system-supporters-call-it-a-milestone.html.
Sunday, Dave. “Hearing on Probation Reform: Senate Judiciary Committee,” September 20,
2021. Accessed February 3, 2022.
https://judiciary.pasenategop.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/42/2021/09/David-Sunday-Y
ork-Co-DA-Probation-Reform-Testimony-9-20-21.pdf.
Taylor, Keeanga-Yamahtta. “Did Last Summer’s Black Lives Matter Protests Change
Anything?” The New Yorker, August 6, 2021. Accessed December 14, 2021.
https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/did-last-summers-protests-change-any
thing.
TCR Staff. “State Legislatures Turn ‘Defensive’ on Justice Reform, Panel Told.” The Crime
Report. March 8, 2022. Accessed March 18, 2022.
https://thecrimereport.org/2022/03/08/state-legislatures-turn-defensive-on-justice-reform
-panel-told/.
The Washington Post Editorial Board. “Reimagine Safety.” The Washington Post, March 16,
2021. Accessed December 14, 2021.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/interactive/2021/reimagine-safety/.
Tonry, Michael H. Thinking about Crime: Sense and Sensibility in American Penal Culture.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
Towler, Christopher C., Nyron N. Crawford, and Robert A. Bennett. “Shut Up and Play: Black
Athletes, Protest Politics, and Black Political Action.” Perspectives on Politics 18, no. 1
(March 17, 2020): 111–27. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592719002597.
“United States Profile.” Prison Policy Initiative, 2020. Accessed December 14, 2021.
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/profiles/US.html.
Urbinati, Nadia, and Mark E. Warren. “The Concept of Representation in Contemporary
Democratic Theory.” Annual Review of Political Science 11, no. 1 (June 15, 2008):
387–412. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.053006.190533.
Vadala, Nick. “Meek Mill Arrested, Charged with Reckless Endangerment in New York City.”
The Philadelphia Inquirer. August 18, 2017. Accessed December 15, 2021.
https://www.inquirer.com/philly/entertainment/celebrities/meek-mill-arrested-charged-wi
th-reckless-endangerment-in-new-york-city-20170818.html.

76
Wacquant, Loïc. “Deadly Symbiosis: When Ghetto and Prison Meet and Mesh.” Punishment &
Society 3, no. 1 (2001): 95–133. https://doi.org/10.1177/14624740122228276.
Yeargain, Tyler. “Prosecutorial Disassociation.” American Journal of Criminal Law 47, no. 1
(2020): 85–138.
Zhorov, Irina. “Why Does Pa. Have so Many Local Governments?” WHYY. September 16,
2014. Accessed March 2, 2022.
https://whyy.org/articles/why-does-pa-have-so-many-local-governments/.

